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Do emotional valence and arousal increase semantic false recognition, 
orthographical false recognition, and suggestibility? Does emotion of memory targets 
have different effects than emotion of retrieval contexts? How, at a process level, does 
emotion influence these false memories? I investigated those questions in college 
students using associative recognition tasks, in which emotional valence and arousal 
can be manipulated factorially over cue and target sides. The importance of 
distinguishing between emotional context and emotional content was confirmed 
because emotion effects varied from side to side. The importance of factorial 
manipulation of valence and arousal was also confirmed because they had distinct and 
interactive effects on true and false memories, and more fundamentally, on gist and 
verbatim processes. 
I also investigated was positive bias in autobiographical memory. I studied the 
behavior of reconstructing over positive details of past performance as a function of 
gist interference and self goal regulation. Participants exhibited a general tendency to 
reconstruct in favor of themselves. This positive bias was especially strong when the 
performance was positively evaluated or when the performance was believed to 
facilitate goal achievement. Interestingly, gist and self goal were operative in different 
situations: Performance with low self-relevance was predominantly sensitive to gist 
manipulation, whereas performance with high self-relevance was exclusively 
responsive to self goal manipulation, resulting in either increased or decreased positive 
bias for the purpose of reducing the discrepancy between the goal and the current self. 
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CHAPTER 1 
General Introduction 
 
  2 
Memory is crucial for building knowledge of the world and constructing a 
history of the self. Contrary to past metaphor of memory as a storehouse of original 
experience, memory is affected in powerful ways by external and internal factors at 
stages of encoding and recollection (Bartlett, 1932; Loftus, 1979, 1993, 1997; Koriat 
& Goldsmith, 1996; Schacter, 1996, 1999). As a consequence, it is highly malleable 
and often deviates from the real experience (for reviews, see Brainerd & Reyna, 2005). 
The prevalence of false memories is intriguing and has direct implications for fields 
that are central to human welfare, where memory accuracy is crucial, such as the law, 
medicine, and psychotherapy (for reviews, see Brainerd & Reyna, 2005).  
A key feature of the past events (e.g., witnessing a robbery, experiencing the 
death of a parent) that may foment especially high levels of false memory is that the 
events are emotionally charged. Although studies on how false memory is influenced 
by the emotional qualities of experience have begun to accumulate (e.g., Anderson & 
Shimamura, 2005; Brainerd, Stein, Silveira, Rohenkohl, & Reyna, 2008; Budson, 
Todman, Chong, Adams, Kensinger, Krangel, & Wright, 2006; Howe, 2007), the 
findings are inconsistent. There are two possible explanations for the observed 
inconsistencies. The first is that valence and arousal have been confounded. For 
example, negative material is not only more negative but also more arousing than 
neutral material (e.g., Budson, Todman, Chong, Adams, Kensinger, Krangel, & 
Wright, 2006; Pesta, Murphy, & Sanders, 2001). Thus, it is impossible to say whether 
the observed differences between negative and neutral material on memory are 
valence effects or arousal effects or both.  
The second is that emotion has been either manipulated as a content variable 
only or as a context variable only. As McGeoch (1942) maintained, ―Everything 
learned is in response to stimulating or antecedent conditions which are a part of the 
learning situation and specific to it‖ (p. 501). It is traditional to distinguish between 
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two basic forms of information that are present in study materials: the contextual cues 
that accompany the presentation of target items and the content of the items 
themselves. A neutral target can be encoded with an emotional cue, and an emotional 
target can be encoded with an otherwise neutral cue. Therefore, it is important to 
progress to designs in which (a) emotion is manipulated over both context and content 
and (b) the context and content manipulations are comparable. 
In addition to emotion, the self is another factor of interest that may contribute 
to memory distortions. As James Mill (1869) wrote, ―The phenomenon of Self and 
that of Memory are merely two sides of the same fact, or two different modes of 
viewing the same fact. ... …This succession of feelings, which I call my memory of 
the past, is that by which I distinguish my Self‖ (p. 174). Based on the 
interconnectedness of memory and the self, memory reconstruction is subject to the 
control of the self and often biased in favor of the self (Conway, 2005; Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Note that memory distortions in general occur due to people‘s 
reliance on meanings and patterns of the experience (gist) rather than the specific 
details (Brainerd & Reyna, 1998, 2005; Ceci & Bruck, 1998). Taken together, what 
are the effects of the self and gist interference on positive bias of autobiographical 
memory? This question remains unclear.  
Recognizing the current issues on false memory and additional factors that 
may influence it, the present project attempts to address these issues and examine the 
effects of two additional factors, that is, emotion and the self. Four empirical studies 
are presented, each focusing on a certain subtype of false memory: semantic false 
memory (Chapter 2), orthographic false memory (Chapter 3), suggestibility (Chapter 
4), and positive bias in autobiographical memory (Chapter 5). The following questions 
concerning false memory, emotion, and self are asked: (a) Do emotional valence and 
arousal increase semantic false recognition, orthographical false recognition, and 
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suggestibility? (b) Does emotion of memory targets have different effects than 
emotion of retrieval contexts? (c) How, at the gist and verbatim process level, does 
emotion influence these false memories? What are the effects of the self and gist 
processing on positive bias in autobiographical memory? 
  5 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
How Do Valence and Arousal Affect Semantic False Memory? 
  8 
Abstract 
This study was motivated by three questions: Does emotion increase semantic false 
recognition? Does emotion has the same effects on the cue and target sides? And how, 
at a process level, does emotion influence such errors? We manipulated valence and 
arousal factorially over retrieval contexts and memory targets using an associative 
recognition task. We obtained results that reconciled some inconsistencies between 
experiments in which emotion was manipulated either on the context side only or on 
the target side only. We found that negative valence increased false memory. The 
importance of distinguishing between emotional context and emotional content was 
confirmed because emotion‘s effects were different on the cue and target sides. At a 
process level, negative valence both suppressed verbatim and enhanced gist on the 
target side but only suppressed verbatim on the cue side; while high arousal 
suppressed verbatim on the target side but enhanced it on the cue side. 
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How Do Valence and Arousal Affect Semantic False Memory? 
A Context-Content Framework 
This research focused on three questions about semantic false memory of 
cue-target word pairs. One question was, does emotion increase or decrease error rates 
in semantic false recognition? Further, does emotion has the same effect on the cue 
and target sides? The last, more fundamental, question was how, at a process level, 
does emotion influence such recognition errors? That is, are processes that increase 
false-memory responses, processes that suppress them, or both affected? We provide 
some background on these questions before reporting our research. 
BACKGROUND 
Emotion 
Laboratory findings have indicated that emotion and memory are interactive 
(see Storbeck & Clore, 2007; Bower, 1981; Dewey, 1894). To study how emotion 
affects memory, it is important, first, to specify dimensions of emotion. One of the most 
widely accepted conceptualizations of these dimensions was developed by Russell and 
colleagues. Russell and Mehrabian (1977) examined 42 commonly reported affects. 
They found that those affects were composed of three factors: valence, arousal, and 
dominance, with valence and arousal accounting for most of the variance (see also, 
Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm, 1993; Russell, 1979; Russell, 1980; Russell, 
Weiss, & Mendelsohn, 1989). The valence dimension ranges from positive to neutral 
to negative, while the arousal dimension ranges from soothing/calming to 
exciting/agitating. According to the model, emotions with the same valence may have 
different levels of arousal. For instance, anger and sadness are both negative in 
valence, but anger is more arousing than sadness. Similarly, emotions with the same 
arousal level may have opposite valences. For example, anger and happiness are both 
highly arousing, but anger is negative and happiness is positive. Cognitive appraisals 
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provide even more detailed conceptualizations of emotions, which we have integrated 
with approaches based on valence and arousal, but the latter dimensions are the focus 
of the present research (see Rivers, Reyna, & Mills, 2008).  
Emotional Memory 
Emotional memory is regarded as a ―domain of declarative memory, namely, 
memory for events or stimuli that are themselves emotional, or that occurred in an 
emotional context‖ (Buchanan & Adolphs, 2004; p. 43). In line with this, researchers 
have studied emotion‘s effects from two perspectives. Some have embedded emotion 
in memory content by simply using emotional stimuli (e.g., words, pictures) as the 
to-be-tested targets, while others have manipulated emotion in memory context by 
embedding emotion in adjacent items that coexist with the neutral memory targets. 
Memory performance for targets is measured, and emotion‘s effects are analyzed. An 
important fact about these methodologies is that they have yielded inconsistent 
findings, which we review below before discussing how they inspired our research. 
Content Manipulation of Emotion: in Target Material 
As the first approach to studying emotion‘s effects on false memory, emotion 
of the to-be-remembered material is varied. Here, Budson, Todman, Chong, Adams, 
Kensinger, Krangel, and Wright (2006) developed an emotional analogy of the 
Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. A standard DRM paradigm (Deese, 
1959, Roediger, Watson, McDermott, & Gallo, 2001) presents subjects with lists of 
semantic associates (e.g., door, glass, pane, shade, ledge, sill, etc.) that converge on a 
non-presented ―theme word‖ or ―critical lure‖ (e.g., window) and then tests their 
memory for the studied lists. Subjects frequently intrude the critical lures on free 
recall tests and exhibit very high levels of false alarms to these words on recognition 
tests. In Budson et al.‘s (2006) emotional DRM paradigm, they generated lists on 
which the presented words (e.g., sex, man, violate, etc.) are semantically related to 
  11 
negatively-valenced critical lures (e.g., rape) and lists on which the presented words 
(e.g., door, glass, pane, etc.) were semantically related to neutral critical lures (e.g., 
window). In a study of younger adults, older adults, and patients with Alzheimer‘s 
Dementia, negative and neutral lists were presented. False recognition of negative 
critical lures was elevated in younger and older adults, but signal detection analyses 
revealed that this was a response bias effect rather than a memory effect. Budson et al. 
concluded that negative lists do not elevate false memory but they create a liberal 
response bias in subjects.  
By contrast, Howe (2007), using the same lists, found that negative lists did 
elevate false memory. He studied recall and recognition of Budson et al.‘s (2006) lists 
with 8 and 12 year old children. His key results were that (a) for true recall, neutral 
items were better recalled than negative items, (b) for true recognition, neutral items 
also were better recognized than negative items, (c) for false recall, negative items were 
recalled less often than neutral ones, and (d) for false recognition, negative items were 
recognized more often than neutral ones. Signal detection analyses indicated that 
findings b and d were indeed memory effects. Howe‘s results are subject to two 
limitations. First, his recognition data were contaminated by prior recall: recall always 
preceded recognition. Second and more important, Budson et al. (2006) did not 
separate valence from arousal: The negative lists were more arousing than the neutral 
lists. Therefore, it is unclear whether Howe‘s results were due to valence, arousal, or 
both. 
Brainerd, Stein, Silveira, Rohenkohl, and Reyna (2008) separated the effects 
of valence from arousal in some experiments with adults. They generated negative, 
neutral, and positive DRM lists that were equated on arousal. They found that false 
memory levels were highest for negative lists, intermediate for neutral lists, and 
lowest for positive lists. Application of a mathematical model (Brainerd, Wright, 
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Reyna, & Mojardin, 2001) to these data revealed that as one progresses from positive 
to neutral to negative valence, (a) the perceived meaning resemblance between false 
and true items increases, and (b) subjects‘ ability to use verbatim memories of true 
items to suppress errors decreases. However, it was not yet clear, from their study, the 
effects of arousal when disentangled with valence.  
Contextual Manipulation of Emotion: in Adjacent Material 
The other approach manipulates emotion in contextual material. One recent 
example of this approach was Touryan, Marian, and Shimamura‘s (2007) study. They 
presented participants with neutral objects in conjunction with negative or neutral 
pictures. In addition to memories for the objects and the pictures, they also measured 
object-in-picture memories with cued associative force-choice recognition tests. 
Although negative pictures were remembered better than neutral pictures, the 
object-in-picture memories were less accurate when objects were encoded in the 
context of negative pictures, compared with in neutral pictures. However, because 
negative pictures were not only more negative in valence but also higher in arousal 
than neutral pictures, it was not clear whether the decrease was due to valence or 
arousal or both.  
Another study by Anderson and Shimamura (2005) was similar but with 
better control on arousal. Participants were asked to listen to neutral words while 
seeing silent films. The films fell into four categories: ―negative‖ (negative valence 
and high arousal; a surgical arm amputation), ―positive‖ (positive valence and 
medium arousal; playful penguins on glaciers), ―arousing‖ (positive valence and high 
arousal; a car running through the city and country streets), and ―control‖ 
(non-emotional; a person mixing batter). They found that word recognition was worse 
when the words were presented with the ―negative‖ film clips, but better when the 
words were presented with the ―arousing‖ film clips. That is, the negatively arousing 
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context impeded word recognition, while the positively arousing context enhanced it. 
However, low and medium levels of arousal were not included, so it is unknown how 
recognition will respond to valence when arousal is low or medium. 
The Present Experiment 
As we have seen, the influence of emotion on false memory has been studied 
by manipulating emotion as a context variable (Anderson & Shimamura, 2005; 
Marian, & Shimamura, 2007) or as a content variable (Brainerd et al., 2008; Budson 
et al., 2006; Howe, 2007). The studies that manipulated emotional content have not 
manipulated emotional context, and the others that manipulated emotional context 
have not manipulated emotional content (the content is predominantly neutral). In real 
life, however, it is hardly possible to segregate content from context because 
information is processed in association. Episodic memory consists of a rich array of 
interrelated components. Among them, the target item, for which memory is tested, is 
considered as content; while the other information, which is encoded with the target 
and later used to cue the retrieval of the target, is referred to context. Context is 
proposed by memory theorists to play a critical role in pointing at and limiting 
retrieval to a small, localized region of long-term memory by uniquely specifying an 
event in enough detail to distinguish it from other similar events stored in memory 
(Malmber & Shiffrin, 2005). Both context and content can be emotionally charged. 
For instance, a neutral target can be encoded with an emotional cue, and an emotional 
target can be encoded with an otherwise neutral cue. Memory is under their conjoint 
influence. Therefore, it is important to progress to designs in which (a) emotion is 
manipulated over both context and content and (b) the context and content 
manipulations are comparable. Thus, we propose a context-content framework that 
simultaneously considers emotion on both sides in a factorial way. By doing so, we 
are able to obtain a comprehensive picture of emotion‘s effects on memory, including 
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the overall effects of contextual valence, contextual arousal, content valence, and 
content arousal, as well as their interactions. This is the logic of our study. 
We adopted an associative recognition task, which integrated the first two 
methods (content manipulation of emotion in target materials and contextual 
manipulation of emotion in adjacent materials). Specifically, emotion was 
manipulated on the cue and target sides of word pairs. In a standard associative 
recognition task, subjects study word pairs and are usually asked to respond to three 
types of pairs on a recognition test: (a) intact pairs, (b) rearranged pairs, and (c) lure 
pairs. For example, if subjects studied A–B and C–D, but not E–F, then A–B and C–D 
are intact pairs, A–D and C–B are rearranged, and E–F is a lure pair. Owing to the aims 
of our experiment, the three types of test pairs we were most interested in were intact 
pairs (A–B, C–D), semantic associate pairs (A–B’, C–D’) and unrelated pairs (A–E, 
C–F). We also presented rearranged pairs (A–D, C–B). The semantic associate pairs 
were ones in which the cue word had been studied, and the target word was the 
strongest forward associate of the studied target word. These associates were selected 
from the Nelson, McEvoy, and Schreiber (1998) norms. The unrelated pairs were ones 
in which the cue word had been studied but the target word was unrelated to the 
studied target word. We were interested in whether participants were able to reject a 
new target (a semantic associate of the old target or an unrelated distractor) with the 
presence of a cue with which the old target was encoded. Thus, in our design, the cue 
words of all test pairs had been studied, whereas target words were of these types: 
studied, unstudied but associated, unstudied and unrelated, and rearranged. 
We used the associative recognition paradigm because it is a standard 
technique for factorial manipulations of variables (valence and arousal in this 
instance) over context and content (i.e., cues and targets). For each of the study pairs 
and the three types of test pairs, the factorial structure was 3 (cue valence: negative, 
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neutral, positive) × 3 (cue arousal: low, medium, high) × 3 (target valence: negative, 
neutral, positive) × 3 (target arousal: low, medium, high). By adopting this design, the 
effects of negative and positive valence could be compared to a neutral baseline, and 
the effects of arousing and calming words could be compared to an intermediate 
baseline. Also, by manipulating valence and arousal over members of study and test 
pairs, this design allowed us to determine whether emotion‘s effects on the 
encoding/retrieval context (cue words) were the same as its effects on the content of 
to-be-tested items (target words), and whether they interacted. 
Concerning the context manipulation, it is worth noting that the literature 
classified context into two types: independent and interactive. The interactive context 
refers to contextual variables that influence the processing of the target item, for 
example, co-presented items. By definition, interactive context implies that it may 
implicitly bias how the target item is processed. Therefore, if the emotion of the cue 
ever shadowed that of the target in a pair (e.g., roach — table), we aligned such 
effects with the general effects of context. 
METHOD 
Subjects 
The subjects were 216 students at a university in the United States, who were 
native speakers of English (mean age=20 years, 72.2% female).  
Materials 
 We used the affective norms for English words (ANEW; Bradley & Lang, 
1999) for emotional manipulation. In the ANEW, each word is rated on 9-point scales 
for both valence and arousal in response to the Self-Assessment Manikin (Lang, 
1980). The valence scale ranges from a smiling happy figure (positive valence; 
corresponding with the numeric value 9) to a frowning, unhappy figure (negative 
valence; numeric value 1); and the arousal scale ranges from an excited, wide-eyed 
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figure (high arousal; corresponding with the numeric value 9) to a relaxed, sleepy 
figure (low arousal; numeric value 1). The arousal scores for words were correlated 
with physiological measures of arousal in people, including changes in heart rate and 
skin conductance (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1998). According to the normative 
scores in the ANEW, we sampled words at three levels of valence and arousal: 
negative valence (value < 3.07), neutral valence (4.13 < value <5.76), positive valence 
(value > 7.06), low arousal (value < 4.10), medium arousal (4.84 < value < 5.54), and 
high arousal (value > 6.00). Thus, the word pool filled the nine cells of a 3 (valence) × 
3 (arousal) matrix. In each cell, we selected 108 words, which were randomly 
assigned to be cues or targets. The total 486 cues and 486 targets were randomly 
paired such that six fell into each of the 81 cells of a 3 (cue valence) × 3 (cue arousal) 
× 3 (target valence) × 3 (target arousal) matrix. These word pairs were divided evenly 
into two sets, one for half of the participants. Due to the length, each set was divided 
into three sub-lists. Each sub-list included another eight pairs which would be tested 
as rearranged pairs later. In addition each sub-list began and ended with an additional 
five pairs as primacy and recency buffers, which came from unused items in the 
sample of words from the ANEW norms.  
For the test list, the word pairs were randomly assigned to one of the three 
conditions: one third were old study pairs (intact pairs), one third preserved the cue 
word of a study pair but replaced the target word with its semantic associate (associate 
pairs), and the other one third preserved the cue word of a study pair but replaced the 
target word with an unrelated distractor (unrelated pair). For the associate pairs, we 
searched for the semantic associates in the Nelson et al. (1998)‘s norms of association, 
then looked up the valence and arousal scores of these associates in the ANEW. 
Usually, a word and its strongest associate were consistent in valence and arousal. For 
example, for an associative pair INFORMATION – PILLOW, sleep was the strongest 
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associate of the target pillow in the Nelson et al.‘s norms, and as positive and 
low-arousal as pillow in the ANEW (for pillow, valence = 7.92, arousal = 2.97; for 
sleep, valence = 7.2, arousal = 2.8). Thus, subjects were asked if INFORMATION – 
SLEEP was studied when they actually studied INFORMATION – PILLOW. In less 
frequent cases, the strongest associate was emotionally inconsistent with the target. 
For instance, Christmas in ATHLETICS – CHRISTMAS was replaced by its second 
strongest associate holiday, because the first strongest associate, tree, was distinct 
from Christmas in arousal (3.42 for tree vs. 6.27 for Christmas), whereas holiday 
(valence =7.55, arousal =6.59) was as positive and high-arousal as Christmas (valence 
= 7.80, arousal = 6.27). For the unrelated condition, the unrelated distractors came 
from unused items in the sample of words from the ANEW norms. Because the 
unrelated pairs were to be used as response bias controls in signal detection analyses, 
we controlled word length and word frequency, using Kucera and Francis‘s (1967) 
norms. The replacement of targets by unrelated distractors was done by random 
assignment except that we controlled emotional consistency between targets and 
unrelated distractors. The primacy and recency pairs on the study list did not figure in 
the test list.  
      The mean valence and arousal values of studied cues, studied targets, associate 
targets, and unrelated targets are reported in Table 2.1. There were two features of the 
emotional manipulation in our study. Firstly, the valence and arousal scores for each 
cell of the 3 (valence) × 3 (arousal) matrix were equated among cues, targets, 
semantic associates, and unrelated distractors. Secondly, emotion varied on a 
manipulated dimension when not varying on the alternative dimension. That is, the 
numeric value of a certain level of a dimension remained equal across the three levels 
of the other dimension. For instance, the valence scores differed significantly among 
negative (valence) – high (arousal), neutral–high, and positive–high, but their arousal 
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scores did not differ statistically. This was valid for cues, targets, semantic associates, 
and unrelated distractors.  
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Table 2.1. Means and standard deviations of valence and arousal  
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Cue Target 
Semantic 
Associate 
Unrelated 
Distractor 
Emotion Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Negative Low         
Valence 3.07 .63 3.07 .63 3.04 1.04 3.04 .44 
Arousal 4.10 .33 4.10 .33 4.10 .08 4.04 .58 
Neutral Low         
Valence 5.14 .50 5.14 .50 5.81 .20 5.12 .28 
Arousal 3.42 .38 3.42 .38 3.77 .13 3.64 .26 
Positive Low         
Valence 7.07 .45 7.07 .45 7.06 .44 7.21 .41 
Arousal 4.02 .57 4.02 .57 3.88 .64 3.88 .71 
Negative Medium         
Valence 2.33 .38 2.33 .38 2.44 .69 2.37 .27 
Arousal 5.27 .39 5.27 .39 4.90 .58 5.19 .43 
Neutral Medium         
Valence 5.39 .71 5.39 .71 4.13 1.51 5.08 .79 
Arousal 4.84 .29 4.84 .29 5.27 .83 4.84 .65 
Positive Medium         
Valence 7.88 .51 7.88 .51 7.61 .46 7.40 .19 
Arousal 5.35 .30 5.35 .30 5.47 .54 5.54 .30 
Negative High         
Valence 2.16 .33 2.16 .33 2.59 .62 2.26 .46 
Arousal 6.46 .54 6.46 .54 7.29 .54 6.70 .49 
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Table 2.1. (Continued) 
Neutral High 
Valence 5.76 1.15 5.76 1.15 5.17 2.07 5.60 1.48 
Arousal 6.05 .38 6.05 .38 6.60 .50 6.00 .67 
Positive High         
Valence 7.93 .46 7.93 .46 8.04 .35 7.85 .48 
Arousal 6.70 .63 6.70 .63 7.12 .47 6.69 .66 
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Procedure  
Subjects participated in an associative recognition task in which they studied 
three sub-lists of word pairs and responded to three recognition tests, one for each 
sub-list. Half of the participants received one set of word pairs, and the other half 
received the other set. The order of presentation of sub-lists was random. On the 
recognition test, the cue word of each pair was always old (appeared in a studied pair), 
whereas the target could be either old (appeared with the cue word at study), or a 
semantic associate, or an unrelated distractor, or a rearranged distractor. For instance, 
if dignified—tornado was an original word pair on the study list, then 
dignified—tornado was old cue—old target, dignified—hurricane was old 
cue—semantic associate, and dignified—addict was old cue—unrelated distractor. 
The recognition instructions emphasized that subjects were to decide whether the 
word presented with the cue was identical to the one paired with that cue on the study 
list. During both the study and test phases, word pairs were presented on a 
front-projection screen, one pair at a time, with a presentation rate of 2.5 sec per pair.   
RESULTS 
Qualitative Patterns   
The proportions of ―old‖ responses to intact pairs, associate pairs and 
unrelated pairs as a function of context valence, context arousal, target valence, and 
target arousal appear in Table 2.2. Subjects exhibited about a 35% hit rate and about a 
15% false-alarm rate for associate pairs (in which only one related target was studied). 
We corrected the raw ―old‖ responses for response bias (for corrected values, see 
Table 2.3) with the familiar two-high threshold statistic Pr (see Snodgrass & Corwin, 
1988). The design of our experiment did not permit other signal-detection statistics 
(such as A‘ and d‘) to be used. That is because, for each subject, there was one test 
probe in each of the 243 cells of the 3(type: intact, associate vs. unrelated) × 3 (cue 
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valence) × 3 (cue arousal) × 3 (target valence) ×3 (target arousal) factorial structure. 
The computation of other statistics would require within-cell replications. It is 
important to note in this connection that prior false-memory experiments have found 
that Pr, A’, and d‘ produce similar findings and that Pr can be more sensitive to 
treatment effects than A’ and d‘ (Seamon, Luo, Kopecky, Price, Rothschild, Fung, & 
Schwartz, 2002). An interpretive advantage of Pr is that its values, like raw hit and 
false-alarm rates, are probabilities. According to a series of analyses of variance 
(ANOVAs), (a) context valence (negative but not positive) decreased true memory but 
did not affect false memory, (b) context arousal (low and high) increased true but did 
not affect false memory, (c) content valence (negative and positive) decreased true 
memory and increased false memory, and (d) content arousal (high but not low) 
decreased true memory but did not affect false memory.  
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Table 2.2. Proportions of ―old‖ responses to true targets, semantic associates, and 
unrelated distractors as functions of context valence, context arousal, target valence, 
and target arousal 
 
  True  
Targets 
Semantic 
Associates 
Unrelated 
Distractors 
  Mean  SD Mean  SD Mean  SD 
 Negative .33  .01 .14  .01 .10  .01 
Cue Valence Neutral .37  .01 .15  .01 .11  .01 
 Positive .34  .01 .14  .01 .10  .01 
 Low .36  .01 .14  .01 .11  .01 
Cue Arousal Medium .33  .01 .14  .01 .11  .01 
 High .35  .01 .14  .01 .10  .01 
 Negative .33  .01 .16  .01 .10  .01 
Target Valence Neutral .36  .01 .12  .01 .10  .01 
 Positive .35  .01 .15  .01 .11  .01 
 Low .36  .01 .13  .01 .10  .01 
Target Arousal Medium .36  .01 .14  .01 .10  .01 
 High .32  .01 .16  .01 .12  .01 
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Table 2.3. Pr values for hit rates, false-alarm rates, and verbatim memory as functions 
of context valence, context arousal, target valence, and target arousal 
 
  Hit False-alarm Verbatim 
  Mean  SD Mean  SD Mean  SD 
 Negative .23  .01 .04  .01 .19  .01 
Cue valence Neutral .26  .01 .04  .01 .22  .01 
 Positive .24  .01 .04  .01 .20  .01 
 Low .25  .01 .03  .01 .22  .01 
Cue arousal Medium .22  .01 .04  .01 .19  .01 
 High .26  .01 .05  .01 .20  .01 
 Negative .23  .01 .06  .01 .17  .01 
Target valence Neutral .26  .01 .02  .01 .24  .01 
 Positive .24  .01 .04  .01 .20  .01 
 Low .27  .01 .04  .01 .23  .01 
Target arousal Medium .26  .01 .04  .01 .21  .01 
 High .20  .01 .04  .01 .16  .01 
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True Memory ANOVA 
We conducted a 3 (cue valence: negative, neutral and positive) × 3 (cue 
arousal: low, medium and high) × 3 (target valence: negative, neutral and positive) × 3 
(target arousal: low, medium and high) ANOVA of Pr values for hits to intact pairs. A 
significant Cue Arousal × Cue Valence × Target Valence × Target Arousal interaction 
was obtained, F(16, 3408) = 15.91, MSE = .26, p <. 001. According to post-hoc 
analyses, first, valence‘s effects were different on the cue and target sides, as indicated 
by a Cue Valence × Target Valence interaction, F(4, 852) = 6.28, MSE = .27, p <. 
001. Second, arousal‘s effects were also different on the cue and target sides, as 
indicated by a Cue Arousal × Target Arousal interaction, F(4, 852) = 11.85, MSE = 
.24, p <. 001. Third, valence and arousal interacted on the cue side, F(4, 852) = 4.04, 
MSE = .27, p <. 001. Fourth, valence and arousal interacted on the target side as well, 
F(4, 852) = 38.42, MSE = .25, p <. 001. Fifth, valence affected true memory on both 
the cue side, F(2,426) = 3.11, MSE = .33, p <. 05, and the target side, F(2,426) = 6.80, 
MSE = .25, p <. 001. Arousal‘s effects were also significant on both sides, F(2,426) = 
7.64, MSE = .25, p <. 01, and F(2,426) = 33.52, MSE = .28, p <. 001. The more 
detailed findings were these: 
The overall picture of how valence affected true memory was simple: Relative to 
neutral cue, negative cue (but not positive cue) decreased the hit rate, F(1,213) = 7.40, 
MSE = .02, p <. 01. Relative to neutral target, negative and positive target both 
decreased the hit rate, F(1,213) = 14.48, MSE = .02, p <. 001, and F(1,213) = 5.36, 
MSE = .02, p <. 05, respectively. The overall picture for arousal was more complex: 
On the cue side, there was a U-shaped relation between arousal and the hit rate, 
quadratic F(1,213) = 14.53, MSE = .26, p <. 001. Both low and high arousal increased 
the hit rate, relative to medium arousal, F(1,213) = 9.02, MSE = .02, p <. 01, and 
F(1,213) = 13.69, MSE = .02, p <. 001. On the target side, however, high arousal 
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decreased the hit rate, relative to both low and medium arousal, F(1,213) = 61.12, 
MSE = .54, p <. 001, F(1,213) = 34.62, MSE = .54, p <. 001. 
False Memory ANOVA 
A parallel 3 (context valence: negative, neutral and positive) × 3 (context arousal: 
low, medium and high) × 3 (target valence: negative, neutral and positive) × 3 (target 
arousal: low, medium and high) ANOVA was computed for the Pr values for 
false-alarm rates for semantic associate pairs. There was a Cue Arousal × Cue 
Valence × Target Valence × Target Arousal interaction, F(16, 3424)=9.35, MSE = .19, 
p <. 001. Post-hoc analyses revealed: First, valence‘s effects were different on the cue 
and target sides, as indicated by a Cue Valence × Target Valence interaction, F(4, 
856) = 4.12,  MSE = .20, p <. 01. Second, arousal‘s effects also were different on the 
cue and target sides, as indicated by a Cue Arousal × Target Arousal interaction, F(4, 
856) = 6.78,  MSE = .18, p <. 001. Third, valence and arousal interacted on the cue 
side, F(4, 856) = 16.00,  MSE = .20, p <. 001. Forth, valence and arousal interacted 
on the target side, F(4, 856) = 13.60,  MSE = .20, p <. 001. Fifth, disregarding the 
interactions, only target valence had significant effects on false-alarm rates, F(2,428) 
= 12.51, MSE = .20, p <. 001. Negative target valence decreased the false-alarm rates, 
relative to neutral target valence, F(1,214) = 22.05, MSE = .02, p <. 001; to a lesser 
degree, positive target valence decreased the false-alarm rates as well, compared with 
neutral target valence, F(1,214) = 12.06, MSE = .01, p <. 01.  
Verbatim Memory ANOVA 
For purposes of theoretical interpretation of the memory effects of emotion, 
we further asked the question ―how, at a process level, does emotion increase memory 
errors‖. Fuzzy-trace theory (e.g., Brainerd & Reyna, 2005) posits that recognition 
involves the retrieval of two types of traces: verbatim (episodic traces of targets‘ 
surface forms) and gist (episodic traces of concepts, meanings, and relations). For true 
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memory, verbatim and gist traces work in concert to support hits. For false memory, 
however, they have opposite effects, with verbatim traces supporting correct 
rejections (e.g., ―No, I didn‘t see dignified—hurricane. It was dignified—tornado.‖) 
and gist traces supporting false alarms (e.g., ―It was a storm-like word.‖). 
Consequently, if only gist processes are enhanced, true and false memories change in 
an associative way (i.e., both increase). By contrast, if verbatim processes are 
impaired while gist processes are enhanced, true and false memories change in a 
dissociative pattern (i.e., true memory decreases but false memory increases).  
To approach this question, it would be desirable to have a pure measure of 
one memory processes or the other. As Schacter and associates (e.g., Schacter, Israel, 
& Racine, 1999) and Seamon and associates (e.g., Seamon et al., 2002) have shown, a 
simple recognition design such as the present one yields a relatively pure verbatim 
memory measure. The logic of that measure runs as follow. The hit rate can be thought 
of as the probability that verbatim memory is successful, plus the probability that gist 
memory is successful, plus response bias. The semantic false-alarm rate, on the other 
hand, can be thought of as the probability that gist memory is successful, plus the 
response bias, minus the probability that verbatim memory is successful. Therefore, 
subtracting the semantic false-alarm rate from the hit rate yields a measure of the 
accuracy of verbatim memory for intact pairs. We did that, for the various list 
conditions of the experiment and obtained a new set of ―verbatim‖ Pr values for intact 
pairs.  
We computed a 3 (context valence: negative, neutral and positive) × 3 
(context arousal: low, medium and high) × 3 (target valence: negative, neutral and 
positive) × 3 (target arousal: low, medium and high) ANOVA of the ―verbatim‖ Pr 
values. We report the results in the same sequence as previously. Again, there was a 
Cue Valence × Cue Arousal × Target Valence × Target Arousal interaction, F(16, 
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3408)=10.84, MSE = .29, p <. 001. Post-hoc analyses of this interaction produced the 
following five patterns with respect to emotion‘s effects on verbatim memory. First, 
valence‘s effects were different on the cue and target sides, F(4, 852) = 7.44,  MSE = 
.29, p <. 001. Second, arousal‘s effects were different on the cue and target sides, F(4, 
852) = 16.88,  MSE = .29, p <. 001. Third, valence and arousal interacted on the cue 
side, F(4, 852) = 5.05,  MSE = .30, p <. 01. Forth, valence and arousal interacted on 
the target side, F(4, 852) = 13.00,  MSE = .31, p <. 001. Fifth, valence affected 
verbatim memory on both sides, F(2, 426) = 3.73,  MSE = .37, p <. 05, F(2, 426) = 
4.36,  MSE = .30, p <. 05, and so did arousal, F(2, 426) = 28.11,  MSE = .31, p <. 
001, F(2, 426) = 26.66,  MSE = .33, p <. 001. The more detailed findings were these: 
Negative cue decreased verbatim memory, relative to neutral cue, F(1,213) = 
7.97, MSE = .03, p <. 01. Negative and positive target suppressed verbatim memory, 
relative to neutral target, F(1,213) = 53.11, MSE = .02, p <. 001, F(1,213) = 25.85, 
MSE = .02, p <. 001. Turning to arousal, high and low cue arousal strengthened 
verbatim memory, relative to intermediate level, F(1,213) = 7.96, MSE = .02, p <. 01, 
F(1,213) = 3.67, MSE = .02, p =. 057. High target arousal impaired verbatim memory, 
relative to intermediate level, F(1,213) = 26.34, MSE = .02, p <. 001. 
Recall that low and high levels of cue arousal increased false memory, 
compared with medium level. It was not because of impairment on verbatim 
presentations, because verbatim Pr values did not differ with cue arousal. Instead, it 
was because of enhancement and overreliance on gist presentations, which was 
evidenced by the associative increase in true- and false-memory. With respect to 
target valence, verbatim traces were suppressed significantly by negative valence, 
indicated by a lower verbatim Pr value for negative than for neutral valence. In 
addition, the dissociation between true- and false-memory (true memory decreased but 
false memory increased) evidenced that gist processes were boosted as well. Thus, 
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negative valence increased false memory via both impairment of verbatim 
presentations and overreliance on gist presentations.  
DISCUSSION 
We obtained results that reconciled some inconsistencies between 
experiments in which emotion has been manipulated only on the content side or only 
on the context side. On the context side, our results agreed with Anderson and 
Shimamura‘s (2005) that negative valence decreased true memory. On the content 
side, our results agreed with Howe‘s (2007) and Brainerd et al.‘s (2008) findings that 
negative valence both fomented false memory and suppressed true memory, relative 
to positive and neutral valence. Consistent with conjoint-recognition data that 
Brainerd et al. reported, the ANOVA of our ―verbatim‖ Pr measure showed that 
negatively-valenced targets produced the lowest overall levels of verbatim memory, 
although we did not find a protective effect for positive valence as Brainerd et al. did. 
Our experiment produced three results of general significance. First, the 
context-content distinction proved to be empirically significant because emotion‘s 
effects were dissimilar on the context and content sides. Second, valence and arousal 
had different effects on memory. Third, emotion (valence and arousal; contextual vs. 
content) influenced memory via dissociated processes. These findings are discussed 
respectively below.  
Context-Content Framework 
This study aimed to draw attention to the need to conduct experiments in 
which the valence and arousal components of emotion are factorially manipulated 
over retrieval contexts and memory targets. In principle, these two sources of 
emotional experience might have different consequences for true or false memory, 
and hence, a complete understanding of emotion‘s effects requires separation of 
context and content influences. Based on our results, the context-content distinction is 
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important because emotion‘s effects were dissimilar on one side and the other. 
Concerning valence, valence had significant overall effects on the target side but not 
on the cue side. In addition, positive valence differed from neutral valence on the 
target side but not on the cue side; only negative valence‘s effects were consistent 
from side to side. Turning to arousal, there was a U-shaped relation between arousal 
level and both true and verbatim memory on the cue side, but a monotonic relation on 
the target side. Moreover, the direction of arousal‘s effects was reversed: high arousal 
increased both true and false memory on the cue side but decreased them on the target 
side. In addition, context- and content-emotion interacted with each another, which 
also demonstrated the significance of having an integrative framework and 
simultaneously manipulating emotion over both sides.  
Valence 
Concerning overall effects, target valence was the only factor that had 
consistent significant effects on false memory. Although both negative and positive 
valence produced increase in false memory relative to neutral valence, negative 
valence increased it to a much larger extent. Thus, we focus further discussion on 
negative target valence. In understanding this effect, three potential explanations can 
be culled from the prior literature on memory and emotion: strengthened gist 
processing, suppressed verbatim processing, and overconfidence. Concerning the first, 
it should be noted that valence is a part of the gist of information, as evidenced by 
elevated false-alarm rates to distractors that only share valence relative to completely 
unrelated distractors (Brainerd et al., 2008; Rivers et al., 2008). In line with this, 
Talmi and Moscovitch (2004) proposed that valenced materials are more semantically 
dense and interconnected than neutral materials. Consequently, they proposed, the 
depth and richness of semantic processing are greater with valenced materials (e.g., 
Dewhurst & Parry, 2000; Ochsner, 2000). In that connection, such materials are known 
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to activate semantic operations such as evaluation and self-referential processing (e.g., 
Christianson, Loftus, Hoffman, & Loftus, 1991; Ochsner, 2000). Semantic processing 
has often been found to elevate false memory more than true memory, resulting in 
reductions in net accuracy (e.g., Payne, Elie, Blackwell, & Neuschatz, 1996; Toglia, 
Neuschatz, & Goodwin, 1999).  
Second, as indicated by the verbatim Pr results, negative valence produced 
weaker verbatim traces than neutral valence. Using the conjoint-recognition model to 
measure the process-level effects of valence, Brainerd et al. (2008) found that 
variations in valenced content produced large differences in the model‘s verbatim- and 
gist-processing parameters. Consistent with what we found, the perceived gist 
resemblance between false and true items was strongest for negative content; 
meanwhile, subjects‘ ability to use verbatim memory to suppress errors was weakest 
for negative content. There is also evidence from neuro-imaging research for verbatim 
and gist effects of valence. For instance, Maratos, Allen, and Rugg (2000) measured 
event-related potentials (ERPs) of neural activity elicited by negative and neutral 
words during the performance of a recognition memory task. The behavioral data 
indicated that the false alarm rate for negative words was approximately doubled than 
that for the neutral words. What‘s more, the ERPs associated with recognizing 
negative and neutral words were different. For the neutral words, there was an early, 
bilateral, frontal effect which has been associated with familiarity-based recognition, a 
subsequent left parietal effect that has been associated with recollection, and an even 
slower right frontal effect that has been associated with post-retrieval monitoring. For 
the emotional words, however, the left parietal effect was of smaller magnitude and of 
shorter duration, and the right frontal effect was not evident at all. These differences 
indicate that veridical retrieval was activated to a lesser extent for the negative words, 
and familiarity-based processing dominated for such negative words.   
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Last, it has been shown in other lines of research that valenced materials 
increase people‘s confidence in the accuracy of remembered information 
(Christianson et al., 1991; Loftus, Loftus, & Messo, 1987; Sharot, Delgado, & Phelps, 
2004). This boost in confidence occurs regardless of the objective accuracy of 
memory (e.g., Kensinger & Schacter, 2006; Levine & Bluck, 2004). Thus, confidence 
elevation may make people less likely to question the authenticity of false memories 
that arise from valenced material.  
It is worth noting that our findings on negative valence are also consistent 
with other research using the DRM paradigm. For instance, Sharkawy, Groth, Vetter, 
Beraldi, and Fast (2008) presented participants with neutral and negative lists of 
words semantically associated to a non-presented critical lure, and then administered a 
recognition test. Critical lures associated with negative word lists elicited significantly 
more false memory than critical lures associated with neutral word lists. Therefore, 
our findings extend other results of negative valence‘s distortive effects in the DRM 
paradigm, as well as the associative recognition paradigm. 
Arousal  
It is well documented that high arousal facilitates long-term memory (e.g., 
Cahill & McGaugh, 1995; Kleinsmith & Kaplan, 1963, 1964; Walker & Tarte, 1963). 
However, in the case of more immediate memory tasks, findings have been 
inconsistent. Some studies have found a detrimental effect for intervals of about 30 
minutes following original encoding (e.g., Butter, 1970; Kleinsmith & Kaplan, 1963, 
1964; Walker & Tarte, 1963). Others, however, have found that high arousal leads to 
superior memory across this same interval (e.g., Corteen, 1969; Maltzman, Kantor, & 
Langdon, 1966). Interestingly, our study, which tested immediate recognition, found 
opposite effects of arousal on the cue and target sides: high arousal on the cue side 
increased hit rates, whereas high arousal on the target side decreased hit rates. 
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Noteworthy here is that, on the process level, high arousal boosted verbatim memory 
on the cue side but decreased verbatim memory on the target side.  
Dual Processes 
According to the fuzzy-trace theory, when only gist processes are enhanced 
or impaired, true and false memories respond similarly (i.e., both increase or 
decrease); when only verbatim processes are enhanced or impaired, true memory 
increases or decreases without changes in false memory; and when verbatim processes 
are impaired and gist processes are enhanced, true memory decreases but false 
memory increases. In connection with the verbatim Pr results, we found context and 
content emotion influenced memory via different processes. With respect to cue 
valence, negative valence decreased hits without significant changes in false-alarms, 
relative to neutral valence. These effects were primarily verbatim interference 
(supported by the verbatim Pr measures), something targets that are especially 
sensitive to. The same pattern was observed for cue arousal and target arousal. 
However, target valence displayed a different pattern. It both suppressed verbatim 
memory and boosted gist memory, resulting in increased false alarms as well as 
decreased hits. Thus, this study illustrates how results for hit rates, false-alarm rates, 
and verbatim Pr values can be integrated and pinpoints the likely process-level effects 
of valence and arousal. 
People experience events in context. So the emotional qualities of context, as 
well as events themselves, are important. The current study is the first one we know of 
that factorially manipulated two dimensions of emotional experience, valence and 
arousal, over context and content. As demonstrated by our study, the two dimensions 
have different effects, and those effects vary as function of context versus content. 
These findings have potential implications for a wide variety of everyday memory 
situations whose hallmark is that the context or the content of to-be-remember 
  35 
information is emotionally changed.  
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Abstract 
This study explored the effects of emotion on false memory for orthographically 
similar items. We separated the effects of emotion on memory context versus memory 
content via an associative recognition procedure: Three levels of emotional valence 
(positive, neutral, negative) and three levels of emotional arousal (high, medium, low) 
were factorially manipulated over the cue (context) and target (content) components 
of word pairs. In general, negative valence was more active than neutral or positive 
valence, and high arousal was more active than medium or low arousal in affecting 
true and false memory. However, their effects varied from side to side. Negative 
valence increased orthographic false memory consistently on the cue side but not on 
the target side; high arousal increased orthographic false memory on the cue side but 
decreased it on the target side. Negative valence decreased true memory on both cue 
and target sides; high arousal increased true memory on cue side but decreased it on 
target side. At a process level, negative valence consistently impaired verbatim 
process on both sides, while high arousal enhanced gist process on the cue side but 
impaired gist and verbatim processes on the target side. 
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How Do Valence and Arousal Affect Orthographic False Memory? 
This study investigated three specific questions about how emotion affects 
orthographic false memory: (a) Does false recognition of words that are 
orthographically similar to studied items vary as a function of words‘ emotional 
attributes? (b) What are the respective effects of the valence and arousal components 
of emotion? And (c) Do valence and arousal have different effects when they are 
manipulated as part of contextual cues versus when they are manipulated as part of the 
to-be-tested items?  
BACKGROUND 
False memory consists of recalling or recognizing events that did not occur or 
misremembering portions of events that did occur. Further, to distinguish false 
memory from errors that arise from response bias, the events that are misremembered 
preserve salient semantic or perceptual features of actual events (e.g., the word collie 
when the word poodle was studied, or the word cattle when the word battle was 
studied) (e.g., Anisfeld & Knapp, 1968; Underwood, 1965; Wallace, Stewart, & 
Malone, 1995; Wallace, Stewart, Shaffer, & Barry, 1998). Since the mid-1990s, a 
large literature on false memory has accumulated, the great preponderance of which 
has focused on word-list tasks, such as the well-known Deese/Roediger/McDermott 
(DRM; Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). The effects of a large number of 
theoretically-motivated manipulations have been studied, and as a result, false 
memory has been brought under rigorous experimental control (for a literature review, 
see Brainerd & Reyna, 2005).  
Although the effects of many informative manipulations have been studied, a 
surprising omission, until recently, concerns how false memory is affected by words‘ 
emotional attributes. This is a surprising lacuna in the data base because the 
acceleration of false memory research in the 1990s was stimulated by the recognition 
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that such errors can be pervasive in some real-world situations that are fraught with 
emotion, such as police interrogations, eyewitness identifications of criminal suspects, 
and psychotheraphpy (for reviews, see Brainerd & Reyna, 2005; Ceci & Bruck, 1995).  
Recently, studies of how false memory is influenced by the emotional qualities of 
experience have begun to accumulate (e.g., Anderson & Shimamura, 2005; Brainerd, 
Stein, Silveira, Rohenkohl, & Reyna, 2008; Budson, Todman, Chong, Adams, 
Kensinger, Krangel, & Wright, 2006; Howe, 2007). The bulk of these studies have 
dealt with how emotion affects semantic false memory, and key finding has been that 
false memory for meaning-preserving words is elevated by words whose emotional 
valence is negative. At a process level, the reason seems to be that negatively-valence 
words generate strong gist memories of words‘ semantic content (see Brainerd et al., 
2008). However, the literature remains very thin with respect to the question of how 
emotion affects the other fundamental type of false memory: the tendency to falsely 
remember items that preserve the physical rather than the semantic features of target 
materials. Consequently, we focus on that question in this research.  
Although there is a modest amount of research with phonological DRM 
paradigm (e.g., Ballou & Sommers, 2008), emotion was not introduced in the 
procedure. The earliest relevant study was emotion in orthographic DRM paradigm 
conducted by Pesta, Murphy, and Sanders (2001). They asked whether emotional 
unstudied words that shared orthographic characteristics with neutral studied words 
would be less frequently recognized than neutral unstudied words that shared 
orthographic characteristics with neutral studied items. In other words, their 
hypothesis was that false memory effect for orthographically similar distractors would 
be suppressed if the distractors were emotional. In an initial experiment, they 
presented subjects with 12 lists of neutral words. The words on each list were 
orthographically related to an unstudied distractor. Half of the distractors were 
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negative (e.g., penis), and half were neutral (e.g., digit). Levels of false recognition 
were lower for the former than for the latter, which suggested that the effects of 
emotional valence on orthographic false memory were the opposite of its effects on 
semantic false memory (since negative valence was found to increase semantic false 
memory). Signal detection analyses revealed that false memory sensitivity was 
stronger for the neutral than the emotional distractors and that response bias was more 
liberal for the neutral than the emotional distractors. Pesta et al. argued that these were 
distinctiveness effects (e.g., see Schacter, Israel, and Racine, 1999): Negative 
distractors such as penis or bitch were so distinctive that subjects assumed that if they 
had studied such words, they would have clearly remembered it. Pesta et al. tested this 
conjecture in a second experiment by simply including three such words on the study 
lists (fuck, piss, and asshole). Consistent with their hypothesis, the false alarm rate for 
emotional distractors were more than doubled. Furthermore, signal detection analyses 
showed that false memory sensitivity was now equal for emotional and neutral 
distractors. Pesta et al. concluded that as along as emotional distractors were not 
highly distinctive, negative valence did not suppress orthographic false memory, 
relative to neutral valence.  
Kensinger and Corkin (2004) extended Pesta et al.‘s (2001) first experiment to 
older versus young adults. Both age groups falsely recognized more neutral than 
emotional distractors. The same pattern was observed with recall tests. Most recently, 
analogous findings were obtained in Chinese subjects with Chinese words. Huang and 
Yeh (2006) generated 24 lists of Chinese words, each of which consisted of 10 
two-character Chinese words. On each list, 5 of the words shared the same first 
character with a distractor word, the other 5 shared the second character with that 
distractor, and all 10 were semantically unrelated to the distractor. In an initial 
experiment, the subjects studied 12 lists of neutral words, 6 that were orthographically 
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related to neutral distractors, 3 that were orthographically related to negative 
distractors, and 3 that were orthographically related to positive distractors. False alarm 
rates were higher for both positive and negative distractors than for neutral distractors. 
The results for negative distractors agreed with Pesta et al.‘s and Kinsinger and 
Corkin‘s findings, and the combined results for positive and negative distractors were 
consistent with the hypothesis that emotional distractors were so distinctive that they 
suppressed the orthographic false memory effect. 
However, Kensinger and Corkin (2004) raised an important criticism of this 
hypothesis: It is unclear whether it is emotional distinctiveness that is operating or 
simply a broader form of distinctiveness that they called conceptual distinctiveness 
(i.e., the emotional contrast between targets and distractors). Huang and Yeh‘s (2006) 
reported a second experiment (Experiment 2C) that supported Kensinger and Corkin‘s 
criticism. It was similar with the aforementioned second experiment of Pesta et al.‘s, 
but it lessened emotional contrast further. Specifically, they repeated their first 
experiment, except that the study lists included positive and negative words, both with 
lures of congruent valence. Now, when subjects could no longer rely on metacognitive 
awareness of a salient conceptual contrast between study and test lists, the effects of 
emotion on orthographic false memory flip-flopped: False-alarm rates were higher for 
positive and negative distractors than for neutral ones. Note that this effect is in line 
with the aforementioned findings about how emotion affects semantic false memory.  
Summing up, it appears that orthographic false memory is not suppressed when 
distractors are emotional—as long as some emotional content is present in study lists, 
so that metacognitive distinctiveness is not confounded with emotion (Pesta et al., 
2001). There is also some evidence (Huang and Yeh, 2006) that negative emotion has 
the same elevating effect on orthographic false memory as it is known to have on 
semantic false memory (e.g., Howe, 2007). Beyond this, however, there are two major 
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uncertainties that need to be resolved: (a) valence versus arousal confounds and (b) 
failure to separate contextual versus content influences of emotion. 
Concerning a, the most obvious uncertainty concerns the respective effects of the 
two basic dimensions of emotion (see Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm, 1993; 
Russell & Mehrabian, 1977): conceptual valence (negative, neutral and positive) and 
physical arousal (low, medium and high). In the larger literature on emotion, it is well 
established that valence and arousal have different effects, at both the behavioral and 
neurological levels. For instance, Kensinger (2004) documented several behavioral 
and neurological differences in the memory effects of valence and arousal.  
However, in all of the experiments that were just summarized, valence and arousal 
were confounded. Specifically, negative and neutral distractors always differed in two 
ways—valence (e.g., bitch is conceptually more negative than digit) and arousal (e.g., 
bitch is physically more arousing than digit). Thus, it is impossible to say whether the 
observed differences between negative and neutral distractors on orthographic false 
memory were valence effects or arousal effects or both. In the literature on semantic 
false memory, however, valence and arousal have been separated, and available data 
show that semantic false memory is elevated by both negative valence and high 
arousal and that the valence effect is substantially larger than the arousal effect (see 
Brainerd et al., 2008). 
Turning to the other uncertainty that is posed by extant studies of emotion effects 
in orthographic false memories, it is traditional to distinguish between memory for 
two basic forms of information that are present in study materials: the contextual cues 
that accompany the presentation of target items and the content of the items 
themselves. As with valence versus arousal, it is well known that variables can have 
different behavioral and neurological effects when they are manipulated over the 
context and target sides of memory experiments (e.g., see Malmberg, 2008). The 
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contextual and content sides of the effects of emotion were not separated in any of the 
aforementioned experiments. Indeed, like the valence and arousal components, 
context and content were confounded because item-recognition designs were used.  
In such designs, study list consisted of single target words, and tests lists consisted of 
single target and distractor words, and thus, the context and content were confounded 
because individual words provide both the memory content that was supposed to be 
accessed and the contextual cues that were used to access it. A traditional method of 
separating the contextual and content effects of variables is to switch to associative 
recognition tests, which allows variables to be factorially manipulate over the cue and 
target members of word pairs (for review, see Yonelinas, 2002). 
In this study, we removed both of these limitations of prior research on how 
emotion affects orthographic false memory by imposing two design modifications. 
First, to eliminate the valence-arousal confound, I factorially manipulated three levels 
of valence (negative, neutral, positive) and three levels of arousal (high, medium, low) 
over study and test lists. Therefore, it was possible to measure the separate 
contributions of valence and arousal to false memory (and also to true memory). An 
additional advantage of this manipulation is that it was possible to compare the effects 
of both negative and positive valence to a neutral base line. In the studies that were 
discussed above, with the exception of a single experiment reported by Huang and Yeh 
(2006), it was not possible to determine the effects of both types of valence relative to 
a neutral baseline. 
Second, to eliminate the context-content confound, we implemented an 
associative recognition design. That is, the subjects first studied a list of word pairs, 
and they were told that they would later take a memory test on which they would have 
to remember the target word that went with each cue word. Next, the subjects 
responded to a test list that also consisted of word pairs. On the test list, the cue 
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member of each pair had appeared on the study list as the cue member of one of the 
studied pairs. However, the target member of each test pair was either (a) the same 
target word that had appeared with that cue on the study list or (b) a new word 
(distractor) that had not appeared on the study list as either a cue or a target. With this 
basic design, it was able to separate the context and context effects of emotion by 
manipulating both valence and arousal factorially over the cue and target members of 
study pairs and test pairs.     
  METHOD  
Subjects 
216 native English speaking college students (mean age=20 years, 72.2% female) 
at a United States university participated in the study. 
Materials 
We used the affective norms for English words (ANEW; Bradley & Lang, 1999) 
to generate a large pool of words with which valence and arousal could be factorially 
manipulated over study and test lists. In the ANEW, each word is rated on 9-point 
scales for both valence and arousal. We sampled words at three levels of valence and 
arousal: negative valence (value < 3.14), neutral valence (4.96 < value < 5.60), 
positive valence (value > 7.03), low arousal (value < 4.14), medium arousal (4.88 < 
value < 5.54), and high arousal (value > 6.00). The resulting words filled the 9 cells of 
a 3 (valence) × 3 (arousal) matrix. These words were randomly sampled to provide the 
cues and targets for the experiment. We generated two sets of word pairs. Each set 
contained 243 word pairs that provided 3 pairs for each of 81 cells in the 3 (cue 
valence) × 3 (cue arousal) × 3 (target valence) × 3 (target arousal) list design. Half 
participants were presented with one or the other set. Due to the length, each set was 
presented as 3 sublists, with subject studying and being tested on each sublist before 
proceeding to the next sublist. Additional word pairs were added to be tested as 
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rearranged pairs later, and as primacy and recency buffers.   
For each set, the word pairs were randomly assigned to one of the three 
conditions in test: old cue/old target (intact pairs), old cue/unpresented but 
orthographically similar target (associate pairs), and old cue/unpresented and 
unrelated target (unrelated pairs). The unrelated words were selected from the unused 
words in the ANEW. The associates were orthographic neighbors obtained from 
Nusbaum, Pisoni, & Davis‘s (1984) computational database of 20,000 English words. 
The primacy and recency pairs from the study list did not figure in the test list.  
The mean valence and arousal values of studied cues, studied targets, associate 
targets, and unrelated targets are reported in Table 3.1. The valence and arousal scores 
for each cell of the 3 (valence) × 3 (arousal) matrix were equated among cues, targets, 
orthographic associates, and unrelated distractors. Note that the mean of valence is 
equal across levels of arousal, and the mean level of arousal is equal across levels of 
valence. This is true for cues, targets, and unrelated distractors.  
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Table 3.1. Means and standard deviations of valence and arousal  
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Cue Target 
Unrelated 
Distractor 
Emotion Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Negative Low       
Valence 3.14 .65 3.22 .64 3.04 .44 
Arousal 4.14 .40 4.03 .45 4.04 .58 
Neutral Low       
Valence 5.19 .48 5.42 .45 5.12 .28 
Arousal 3.46 .41 3.42 .35 3.64 .26 
Positive Low       
Valence 7.03 .48 7.11 .43 7.21 .41 
Arousal 4.02 .56 4.07 .34 3.88 .71 
Negative Medium       
Valence 2.39 .35 2.53 .44 2.37 .27 
Arousal 5.29 .36 5.01 .24 5.19 .43 
Neutral Medium       
Valence 5.11 1.06 5.50 .75 5.08 .79 
Arousal 4.88 .24 5.03 .54 4.84 .65 
Positive Medium       
Valence 7.89 .51 7.60 .36 7.40 .19 
Arousal 5.38 .29 5.25 .34 5.54 .30 
Negative High       
Valence 2.14 .34 2.12 .48 2.26 .46 
Arousal 6.33 .44 6.33 .51 6.70 .49 
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Table 3.1 (Continued) 
Neutral High 
Valence 5.58 1.30 4.96 1.16 5.60 1.48 
Arousal 6.15 .44 6.16 .46 6.00 .67 
Positive High       
Valence 7.83 .42 8.00 .38 7.85 .48 
Arousal 6.76 .60 6.76 .52 6.69 .66 
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Procedure  
We used a revised associative recognition task, which is a standard technique for 
factorial manipulations of variables (valence and arousal in this instance) over context 
and content. In such tasks, subjects study word pairs and are usually asked to respond 
to three types of word pairs on a recognition test: (a) intact pairs, (b) rearranged pairs, 
and (c) distractor pairs. For example, if subjects studied A–B and C–D, but not E–F, 
then A–B and C–D are intact pairs, A–D and C–B are rearranged pairs, and (c) E–F is a 
lure pair. Owing to the aims of this experiment, we revised the task to include four types 
of test pairs: intact pairs (A–B, C–D), associate pairs (A–B’, C–D’; in which B’ and D’ 
are orthographic associates of B and D, respectively), unrelated pairs (A–E, C–F; in 
which E and F are unpresented and unrelated to B and D), and rearranged pairs (A-D, 
C-B). 
The subjects studied three sublists of word pairs and responded to three 
recognition tests, one for each sublist. On each recognition test, the cue word of each 
pair was always old (appeared in a studied pair), whereas the target could be either old 
(appeared with that cue word at study), an orthographic associate of the previous 
target, a word that was unrelated to the previous target, or a re-arranged cue-target 
pair. The subjects were instructed to decide whether or not the target word went with 
each cue word in a studied pair. During both the study and test phases, word pairs 
were presented visually, in random order, on a front-projection screen, one pair at a 
time, with a presentation rate of 2.5 sec per pair. 
RESULTS 
Qualitative Patterns   
According to the proportions of ―old‖ responses to intact pairs, associate pairs 
and unrelated pairs as a function of context valence, context arousal, target valence, 
and target arousal (see Table 3.2), subjects exhibited about a 35% hit rate and about a 
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13% false-alarm rate for associate pairs (in which only one related target was 
studied).We then corrected the raw hit and false-alarm rates for associate pairs for 
response bias (for corrected values, see Table 3.3), using two-high threshold statistic 
Pr (see Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988). We chose Pr over other signal-detection statistics 
(such as A‘ and d‘) for two reasons. First, for each individual subject, the test list 
contained only one probe in each experimental condition. The computation of Pr does 
not require within-cell replication. Second, previous false memory experiments has 
found that Pr produces similar results to A’ and d‘, and that it is more sensitive to some 
treatment effects (Seamon, Luo, Kopecky, Price, Rothschild, Fung, & Schwartz, 
2002).  
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Table 3.2. Proportions of ―old‖ responses to true targets, orthographic associates, and 
unrelated distractors as functions of context valence, context arousal, target valence, 
and target arousal 
 
  True  
Targets 
Orthographic 
Associates 
Unrelated 
Distractors 
  Mean  SD Mean  SD Mean  SD 
 Negative .33  .01 .14  .01 .10  .01 
Cue Valence Neutral .37  .01 .13  .01 .11  .01 
 Positive .34  .01 .11  .01 .10  .01 
 Low .36  .01 .13  .01 .11  .01 
Cue Arousal Medium .33  .01 .11  .01 .11  .01 
 High .35  .01 .13  .01 .10  .01 
 Negative .33  .01 .13  .01 .10  .01 
Target Valence Neutral .36  .01 .12  .01 .10  .01 
 Positive .35  .01 .13  .01 .11  .01 
 Low .36  .01 .12  .01 .10  .01 
Target Arousal Medium .36  .01 .13  .01 .10  .01 
 High .32  .01 .13  .01 .12  .01 
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Table 3.3. Pr values for hit rates, false-alarm rates, and verbatim memory as functions 
of context valence, context arousal, target valence, and target arousal 
 
  Hit False-alarm Verbatim 
  Mean  SD Mean  SD Mean  SD 
 Negative .23  .01 .04  .01 .20  .01 
Cue valence Neutral .26  .01 .02  .01 .24  .01 
 Positive .24  .01 .01  .01 .23  .01 
 Low .25  .01 .02  .01 .23  .01 
Cue arousal Medium .22  .01 .004  .01 .22  .01 
 High .26  .01 .04  .01 .22  .01 
 Negative .23  .01 .03  .01 .20  .01 
Target valence Neutral .26  .01 .02  .01 .25  .01 
 Positive .24  .01 .02  .01 .23  .01 
 Low .27  .01 .03  .01 .25  .01 
Target arousal Medium .26  .01 .03  .01 .23  .01 
 High .20  .01 .003  .01 .19  .01 
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Using the bias corrected hit rate and the bias corrected false alarm rate for 
associate pairs, I conducted a series of analyses of variance (ANOVAs). The overall 
effects of context and content emotion on true and false memories were: (a) Context 
valence (negative but not positive) decreased true memory and increased orthographic 
false memory, relative to neutral valence; (b) content valence (negative and positive) 
decreased true memory but did not affect false memory, relative to neutral valence; (c) 
context arousal (low and high) increased both true and false memory, relative to 
intermediate level; and (d) content arousal (high but not low) decreased both true and 
false memory, relative to intermediate level. 
True Memory ANOVA 
A 3 (cue valence: negative, neutral and positive) × 3 (cue arousal: low, medium 
and high) × 3 (target valence: negative, neutral and positive) × 3 (target arousal: low, 
medium and high) ANOVA of Pr values was computed for hits to intact pairs. The key 
result was a Cue Arousal × Cue Valence × Target Valence × Target Arousal 
interaction, F(16, 3408) = 15.91, MSE = .26, p <. 001. Post-hoc analyses of this 
interaction revealed that (a) emotional valence‘s effects were different than the effects 
of arousal, (b) the effects of arousal interacted with emotional valence‘s effects, and 
(c) the context effects of valence and arousal were different than the content effects. 
First, valence‘s effects were different on the cue and target sides, as indicated by a 
Cue Valence × Target Valence interaction, F(4, 852) = 6.28, MSE = .27, p <. 001. 
Second, arousal‘s effects were also different on the cue and target sides, as indicated 
by a Cue Arousal × Target Arousal interaction, F(4, 852) = 11.85, MSE = .24, p <. 
001. Third, valence and arousal interacted on the cue side (i.e., the relation between 
context valence and the hit rate was different for different arousal levels), F(4, 852) = 
4.04, MSE = .27, p <. 001. Fourth, valence and arousal interacted on the target side 
(i.e., the relation between content valence and the hit rate was different for different 
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arousal levels), F(4, 852) = 38.42, MSE = .25, p <. 001. Fifth, valence affected true 
memory on both the cue side, F(2,426) = 3.11, MSE = .33, p <. 05, and the target side, 
F(2,426) = 6.80, MSE = .25, p <. 001. So did arousal, F(2,426) = 7.64, MSE = .25, p 
<. 01, and F(2,426) = 33.52, MSE = .28, p <. 001, respectively. The more detailed 
findings were these: 
Relative to neutral context, negative context decreased the hit rate, F(1,213) = 
7.40, MSE = .02, p <. 01, whereas positive context made no changes. Relative to 
neutral content, negative and positive content both decreased the hit rate, F(1,213) = 
14.48, MSE = .02, p <. 001, F(1,213) = 5.36, MSE = .02, p <. 05, respectively. 
Turning to arousal, on the cue side, there was a U-shaped relation between arousal and 
the hit rate, quadratic F(1,213) = 14.53, MSE = .26, p <. 001. Both low and high 
arousal increased the hit rate, relative to medium arousal, F(1,213) = 9.02, MSE = .02, 
p <. 01, and F(1,213) = 13.69, MSE = .02, p <. 001. On the target side, high arousal 
decreased the hit rate, relative to both low and medium arousal, F(1,213) = 61.12, 
MSE = .54, p <. 001, F(1,213) = 34.62, MSE = .54, p <. 001. 
False Memory ANOVA 
A parallel 3 (context valence: negative, neutral and positive) × 3 (context arousal: 
low, medium and high) × 3 (target valence: negative, neutral and positive) × 3 (target 
arousal: low, medium and high) ANOVA was conducted for the Pr values for 
false-alarm rates for orthographic associate pairs. There was a Cue Arousal × Cue 
Valence × Target Valence × Target Arousal interaction, F(16, 3376)=9.16, MSE = .17, 
p <. 001. According to post-hoc analyses, first, valence‘s effects were different on the 
cue and target sides, as indicated by a Cue Valence × Target Valence interaction, F(4, 
844) = 13.58,  MSE = .19, p <. 001. Second, arousal‘s effects also were different on 
the cue and target sides, as indicated by a Cue Arousal × Target Arousal interaction, 
F(4, 844) = 6.62,  MSE = .17, p <. 001. Third, valence and arousal interacted on the 
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cue side, F(4, 844) = 2.64,  MSE = .17, p <. 05. Forth, valence and arousal interacted 
on the target side, F(4, 844) = 7.74,  MSE = .18, p <. 001. Fifth, valence‘s effects 
were restricted to the cue side, F(2,422) = 6.28, MSE = .20, p <. 001. Negative context 
increased the false-alarm rate, relative to neutral or positive context, F(1,211) = 5.55, 
MSE = .43, p <. 05, and F(1,211) = 12.26, MSE = .38, p <. 001, respectively. Arousal, 
however, affected false memory on both sides, F(2,422) = 8.55, MSE = .18, p <. 001, 
and F(2,422) = 7.00, MSE = .20, p <. 01. There was a U-shaped relation between 
context arousal and the false-alarm rate, quadratic F(1,211) = 5.00, MSE = .02, p <. 
001. Low and high arousal increased it, relative to medium arousal, F(1,211) = 5.47, 
MSE = .01, p <. 05, F(1,211) = 18.07, MSE = .01, p <. 001. On the content side, high 
arousal decreased false memory, relative to low and medium arousal, F(1,211) = 7.10, 
MSE = .44, p <. 01, F(1,211) = 13.20, MSE = .38, p <. 001.  
Verbatim Memory ANOVA 
In order to aid theoretical interpretation of emotion‘s effects on memory, we 
report a further ANOVA that was more process oriented. According to fuzzy-trace 
theory (e.g., Brainerd & Reyna, 2005), there are two types of representations of study 
list words that underlie true and false recognition: verbatim traces of their surface 
forms and gist traces of relational information. Verbatim traces are episodically 
tagged representations of words‘ surface features, whereas gist traces are episodically 
tagged representations of their meanings, senses, and patterns (e.g., Brainerd & 
Reyna, 2005; Reyna & Brainerd, 1995). The two types of representations work in 
concert to support true memory, but they have opposite effects on false memory: 
Verbatim traces support correct rejections (e.g., ―No, I didn‘t see toy. It was joy.‖), 
whereas gist traces (―-oy”) support false alarms. When a distractor shares 
orthographic gist with a target, errors can therefore be suppressed by retrieving the 
target‘s verbatim trace. The verbatim trace generates a subjective contrast effect 
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(known as recollection rejection; Brainerd, Reyna, Wright, & Mojardin, 2003) in 
which subjects notice both the similarity between the distractor and target and their 
nonidentity.  
Here, it is possible, with the present design, to obtain purified measures of how 
verbatim memory reacts to experimental manipulations on emotion by implementing a 
form of signal detection analysis that was introduced by Schacter et al. (1999) and has 
also been used by Seamon and associates (e.g., Seamon et al., 2002). The normal 
method of correcting the hit rate for response bias, of which the Pr statistic of the 
earlier true memory ANOVA is an example, uses the false-alarm rate for unrelated 
distractors. Theoretically, false alarms to such distractors cannot be due to verbatim 
memory for their presentation (because they were not presented) or to gist memory for 
relational information (because they are not related to anything that was presented), 
and hence, such errors must be due to response bias. On other hand, target hits can be 
due to verbatim memory or gist memory or response bias, and false alarms to related 
distractors can be due to either gist memory or response bias (but not verbatim 
memory for targets because that will suppress such errors (Brainerd et al., 1999)). 
Thus, as Schacter et al. (1999) pointed out, correcting the hit rate by using the 
false-alarm rate for related distractors provides additional information beyond that 
which is provided by using the false-alarm rate for unrelated distractor. In particular, 
if the related distractor false-alarm rate is used to correct the hit rate, the resulting 
statistic is a purified measure on the extent to which the hit rate is based on verbatim 
memory. (That is because verbatim memory, gist memory, and response bias all 
produce hits, whereas only gist memory and response bias produce false alarms of 
related distractors.)  
Therefore, we computed a new test of target Pr values for the various conditions 
of this experiment, using the false-alarm rates for associate pairs rather than unrelated 
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pairs. The mean Pr values appear in the next-to-last column of Table 2. Using these 
―verbatim‖ Pr values, we computed a 3 (context valence: negative, neutral and 
positive) × 3 (context arousal: low, medium and high) × 3 (target valence: negative, 
neutral and positive) × 3 (target arousal: low, medium and high) ANOVA. Again, 
there was a Cue Valence × Cue Arousal × Target Valence × Target Arousal 
interaction, F(16, 3360)=8.57, MSE = .28, p <. 001. Post-hoc analyses of this 
interaction produced the following five patterns with respect to emotion‘s effects on 
verbatim memory. First, valence‘s effects were different on the cue and target sides, 
F(4, 840) = 13.81,  MSE = .28, p <. 001. Second, arousal‘s effects were different on 
the cue and target sides, F(4, 840) = 9.65,  MSE = .26, p <. 001. Third, valence and 
arousal interacted on the cue side, F(4, 840) = 6.92,  MSE = .28, p <. 001. Forth, 
valence and arousal interacted on the target side, F(4, 840) = 14.19,  MSE = .29, p <. 
001. Fifth, valence affected verbatim memory on both the cue and target sides, but 
arousal‘s effects were confined to the target side. The more detailed findings were 
these: 
Relative to neutral valence, negative valence impaired verbatim memory on both 
sides. Specifically, negative cue decreased verbatim memory, relative to neutral and 
positive cue, F(1,210) = 17.96, MSE = .67, p <. 001, F(1,210) = 8.12, MSE = .90, p <. 
01. Negative and positive target suppressed verbatim memory, relative to neutral 
target, F(1,210) = 23.00, MSE = .02, p <. 001, F(1,210) = 5.12, MSE = .02, p <. 05,. 
Turning to arousal, high target arousal decreased verbatim memory, relative to 
medium arousal, F(1,210) =13.65, MSE = .16, p <. 001, and low arousal, F(1,210) 
=24.24, MSE = .20, p <. 001. 
DISCUSSION 
In this experiment, we manipulated emotional valence and arousal factorially 
over the cue and target sides of word pairs. The findings were consistent with the 
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extant research: For true memory, there was an agreement that correct recognition was 
better for neutral than emotional items (see Pesta et al., 2001; Huang & Yeh, 2006). 
For false memory, when negative valence was not presented in study lists (Experiment 
1 of Pesta et al., 2001; Kensinger & Corkin, 2004; Experiment 1A of Huang & Yeh, 
2006), false memory for negative lures was less frequent than that for neutral lures 
due to the conceptual distinctiveness effect. However, when negative valence was 
experienced (even only half as often as neutral valence) in study lists, false memory 
for negative lures reached the same frequency as that for neutral lures (Experiment 1B 
of Huang & Yeh, 2006). In the current study, where negative valence was experienced 
as frequently as neutral valence, false memory for negative lures further increased and 
actually surpassed that for neutral ones. Therefore, when not confounded with 
conceptual distinctiveness, negative emotion increased false alarm rates.  
Interestingly, the finding on negative valence is prevalent in the literature of 
other forms of memory with vivid physical features, such as memory of pictures and 
videos. For instance, in a picture-word associative paradigm, Anderson and 
Shimamura (2005) vocally presented participants with neutral words when they were 
watching silent films. The films fell into four categories: negative (and high arousal; a 
surgical arm amputation), positive (and medium arousal; playful penguins on 
glaciers), arousal (and positive; a car running through the city and country streets), 
and control (non-emotional; a person mixing batter). Consistent with the current 
results, they found that (a) memory for details of the negative film was poorer than 
that for the control film, (b) words associated with the negative film were recalled less 
than those associated with other films, (c) recognition judgments on ―whether a word 
was presented‖ and ―with which film it was presented‖ were disrupted when words 
were studied during the negative film, but enhanced when they were studied during 
the arousal film, and (d) the positive film did not affect memory in all tests. Similarly, 
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Touryan, Halberg, & Shimamura (2003) reported poorer memory for words presented 
with negative pictures. In addition, Aupee (2007), using the IAPS (Lang, Bradley, & 
Cuthbert, 1995), also found that accuracy scores were higher for neutral than negative 
and positive pictures, whereas false recognition scores were lower for neutral than 
negative and positive pictures.  
The same effect was also observed in source monitoring literature. For example, 
spatial and temporal source memory for negative words were found significantly 
below the baseline of neutral and positive words (Maddock & Frein, 2009), while 
false alarm rates in source monitoring were higher for negative than for neutral 
material (e.g., Cook, Hicks, & Marsh, 2007). The effect of negative valence may be 
aptly explained by the emotional withdrawal effect proposed by Davidson (1998). 
According to Davidson, there are two fundamental aspects of emotion: approach and 
withdrawal, wherein negativity ―increase(s) the distance between the organism and a 
source of aversive stimulation.‖ Being withdrawn, one is reluctant to be close to the 
stimulus, and only able to gripe the gist of it. As a result, the verbatim representations 
are incomplete and one has to rely on the gist representations, which lead to an 
elevation in false memory.  
Overall, memory was most accurate (i.e., the difference between the hit rate and 
the orthographic false-alarm rate was maximal) when the valence was neutral and 
arousal was moderate. This was counter-intuitive because the usual beliefs are that 
emotional stimuli are better memorized. The discrepancy between subjective and 
object estimates of memories for emotional stimuli is related to a vividness feeling 
triggered by the emotion (Reisberg & Heuer, 2004). As a matter of fact, when emotion 
is involved, memory functions differently. As Comblain and colleagues (2004) 
demonstrated, ―remember‖ judgments (in the Remember/Know paradigm) for 
emotional pictures were essentially based on the remembrance of emotional reactions 
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and thoughts associated with the pictures, but to a much less degree on the 
recollection of perceptual details. In the same vein, the fMRI findings obtained by 
Sharot and collaborators (2004) indicated that ―remember‖ judgments for emotional 
pictures were sustained by amygdala, known to be involved in emotional arousal 
perception. In contrast, ―remember‖ judgments to neutral pictures were accompanied 
by increased neuronal activity in the parahippocampal cortex, a region typically 
involved in the remembering of scenic details. In one word, emotion boosts 
confidence, which does not necessarily reflect the real memory accuracy.  
We will further discuss dual processes and context vs. content manipulation. In 
connection with the verbatim Pr results, we found context and content emotion 
influenced memory via different processes. According to the fuzzy-trace theory, when 
verbatim processes are impaired and gist processes are enhanced, true memory 
decreases but false memory increases, which was the effects of negative context in 
this study. When only gist processes are enhanced, both true and false memories 
increase, which was the case of context arousal here. When only verbatim processes 
are impaired, true memory decreases without changes in false memory, which was 
displayed by negative content. Lastly, when both verbatim and gist processes are 
impaired, true and false memory decrease, as the effects of high content arousal.  
With respect to the context-content manipulation, the data indicated that memory 
was influenced not only by the emotion of the targets but also by the emotion of the 
cues. More importantly, they had different effects. Arousal, in particular, was 
sensitive to the cue-target manipulation. It displayed U-shaped effects on the cue side 
but not on the target side. What‘s more, the direction of arousal‘s effects was 
reversed: High arousal increased both true and false memory on the cue side but 
decreased both memories on the target side. Thus, the context-content manipulation is 
especially important for studying arousal‘s effects. 
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To conclude, it is worth noting that the emotion‘s effects on orthographic false 
memory reported in this study were consistent with those on semantic false memory 
from other recent studies. Negative valence, disregarding interactions, reduced 
accuracy of memory by narrowing the gap between the hit rate and the false-alarm 
rate for associate pairs
1
. This net effect is the same as the net effect of negative 
valence in semantic false memory experiments (Brainerd et al., 2008; Howe, 2007). 
Concerning the size of valence effects, although negative valence affected false-alarm 
rates, relative to neutral valence, positive valence did not. Again, this is consistent the 
smaller effects that have been observed for positive valence in semantic false memory 
(Brainerd et al., 2008). Further, the verbatim analyses indicated that negative valence 
was associated with impaired verbatim memory, compared with the neutral baseline, 
which was also found in semantic false memory research (Brainerd et al., 2008).  
The consistency is of theoretical importance because orthographic and semantic 
memories are two distinct cognitive processes. Orthographic false memory is memory 
errors for perceptually (visually) similar stimuli, whereas semantic false memory is 
errors for conceptually similar stimuli. We know from developmental studies (e.g., 
Dewhurst & Robinson, 2004; Holiday & Weekes, 2006) that false memories for 
semantic and perceptual relatedness showed opposite developmental trajectories from 
early childhood to adolescents. Semantic false memory increased with age, whereas 
perceptual (phonological/orthographic) false memory decreased with age. Thus it is 
intriguing to see that these two types of false memory respond to emotion in the same 
way. A theoretical interpretation would be this. As we know from the fuzzy-trace 
theory that false memory is based on gist representations: gist of similarity. Indeed, 
this is what both types of false memories have in common. The orthographic 
similarity (i.e., a certain visual pattern) contributes to orthographic false memory, 
while the semantic similarity (i.e., the same theme or category) leads to semantic false 
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memory. The converging findings between the two types of false memory highlighted 
the importance of gist as the underlying process of false memory.  
Research on emotion and orthographic false memory is important in the fields 
where memory of details is crucial and memory is emotionally charged. For instance, 
similarity in the spelling between drug names (e.g., Xenical1 and Xeloda1) leads to 
not only wrong purchase of patients but also errors in prescription, dispensation, and 
administration of health professionals (Davis, 1997). In fact, one forth of medication 
errors voluntarily reported in the US identifies name confusion of drug products as the 
primary cause (US Pharmacopeia, 1993, 1995, 1997; Davis, 1997). Another field of 
implication is the law, where memory failures for perceptual details of an event can 
bias testimony and lead to misjudgment. Therefore, understanding how true and false 
memories change under emotional situations is of importance. The current study 
demonstrated that memory is reconstructive and manipulation of valence and arousal 
increased the likelihood of flawed reconstruction. 
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Footnotes 
1. Negative valence on the cue side increased the orthographic false-alarm rates, 
relative to neutral or positive valence. The same numerical trend was obtained on the 
target side, although statistically insignificant.
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CHAPTER 4 
 
How Do Valence and Arousal Affect Suggestibility? 
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Abstract 
Do emotional valence and arousal increase suggestibility to false suggestive 
questions? Do emotional valence and arousal of memory targets have different effects 
than those of retrieval contexts? I investigated those questions by manipulating 
valence and arousal factorially in an associative recognition paradigm. Negative 
valence increased suggestibility for false suggestive questions, relative to positive 
valence, when arousal was low; no differences when arousal was high. Such effects 
were observed no matter emotion was manipulated over the target or the cue side, 
although the underlying memory processes may be different. 
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How Do Valence and Arousal Affect Suggestibility? 
Introduction 
Suggestibility, according to its broadest definition, concerns ―the degree to 
which individuals‘ encoding, storage, retrieval, and reporting of events can be 
influenced by a range of social and psychological factors‖ (Bruck & Ceci, 1999; Ceci 
& Bruck, 1993). It implies that (a) suggestibility is a multifaceted construct with 
cognitive and social bases; (b) it can be unconscious or conscious; and (c) it can result 
from the provision of post- or pre-vent information. A narrower definition refers 
suggestibility to ―the extent to which individuals come to accept and subsequently 
incorporate post-event information into their memory recollections‖ (Gudjonsson, 
1986, p. 195; see also Powers, Andriks, & Loftus, 1979), which only focuses on the 
emotional-cognitive aspect (i.e., not social or inter-personal aspect), the unconscious 
form (i.e., not confabulation, acquiescence to social demands, or lying), and post-event 
information.  
To measure suggestibility, Gudjonsson (1984) developed the Gudjonsson 
Suggestibility Scales (GSS1 and GSS2), which identified two aspects of interrogative 
suggestibility: ―Yield‖, the tendency to submit to misleading questions, and ―Shift‖, 
the tendency to change answers under conditions of social pressure. In the procedure, 
subjects listen to a narrative, and then report all they recall about the story. The 
passage is sufficiently long for them to be unable to remember all the details. 
Following this, the subjects are asked 20 questions about the story, 15 of which 
contain suggestive cues. Affirmative answers to the suggestive cues are labeled as 
―Yield‖. After all the 20 questions are answered, the subjects are told in an 
authoritative manner that they have made a number of errors and must answer the 
questions once more and try to be more accurate this time. The 20 questions are 
subsequently repeated and the quantity of changes in response to the 15 suggestive 
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questions is scored for ―Shift‖.  
Although emotion is widely regarded as a bi-dimensional construct with one 
dimension of valence and another of arousal, the majority of previous research on 
emotion and suggestibility either studied valence effects without controlling arousal or 
studied arousal effects without controlling valence. As a consequence, the findings 
were mixed. Concerning valence, research disagreed on whether negative valence 
increased or decreased suggestibility. On one hand, Ceci, Loftus, Leichtman, and 
Bruck (1994) reported that fewer preschool-aged children assented to a negative false 
event (―falling off a tricycle and getting stitches in the leg‖) than a false positive event 
(―taking a hot air balloon ride‖) (for a review, see Bruck & Ceci, 1997). On the other 
hand, Otgaar, Candel, and Merckelbach (2008) found that 7-year-olds assented to a 
negative false narrative (‗‗being accused by the teacher for copying off your 
neighbor‖) and developed more false memories than they did for a neutral narrative 
(‗‗moving to another classroom‖). There were also studies that found no relationship 
between valence and suggestibility. As Hyman, Husband, and Billings (1995) 
reported, college students assented to and created false memories for a negative 
childhood experience (―an overnight hospitalization‖) as equally likely as for a 
positive one (―a birthday party with pizza and a clown‖) in response to misleading 
information and repeated interviews. 
Turning arousal, unlike valence which was manipulated in memory material, 
arousal was mainly manipulated as stress levels of individuals. The findings are also 
indecisive though. Some studies showed that arousal was associated with enhanced 
memory and decreased suggestibility. For example, Goodman and colleagues 
observed children in medical procedures and found that those who displayed higher as 
opposed to lower emotional arousal during medical procedures exhibited enhanced 
memory or no memory decrement for the procedures and less suggestibility 
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(Goodman, Bottoms, Schwartz-Kenney, & Rudy, 1991; Goodman, Hirschman, Hepps, 
& Rudy, 1991). Other studies, however, yielded the opposite result. For instance, 
Peters (1991) varied children‘s level of stress by unexpectedly sounding either a fire 
alarm (high stress) or a loud radio (low stress). The children were then engaged in 
several activities with a confederate. A week later, the high-stress group recalled less 
about the event and was more susceptible to misleading questions about what the 
confederate did, said, and looked like than did the low-stress group. Merritt, Ornstein, 
& Spicker (1994) also found that high arousal impaired memory for a stressful 
medical procedure and increased suggestibility. The discrepancy has been well 
documented by Bruck and Melnyk‘s review (2004) of 15 studies on the effects of 
children‘s arousal during the target event on their later suggestibility: 50% of the 
studies showed no reliable effects of stress on suggestibility, 25% showed a high 
stress-high suggestibility relationship, whereas 25% showed the reverse effect.  
As we have seen, the method of manipulating valence (emotion of target 
events) is dramatically different than the method of manipulating arousal (mood states 
of participants). Obviously, it is important to progress to designs in which (a) valence 
and arousal manipulations are comparable (e.g., both manipulated on memory 
material), and (b) they do not confound. Recently, Porter and colleagues conducted a 
series of experiments on accuracy and suggestibility where they compared different 
valence conditions with arousal controlled. Porter, Spencer, and Birt (2003) divided 
subjects into three valence conditions, viewing positive, neutral, or negative scenes. 
Half of the subjects in each condition answered a questionnaire, with half of the 
questions containing misinformation. Then all the subjects took a free recall test and 
answered a series of open-ended questions. The researchers found the misled subjects 
(42.6%) were as half accurate as the nonmisled subjects (79.5%). More interestingly, 
emotion had a strong impact on suggestibility to the misinformation. Subjects who 
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saw negative scenes (80%) were twice as likely to recall seeing a suggested item in the 
scenes as those who saw positive or neutral scenes (40%). Later, Porter and colleagues 
(2010) used a slightly different design but reached to the same conclusions. 
Participants viewed highly positive and highly negative pictures. Half of the 
participants were exposed to misinformation about the pictures and asked to answer 
questions concerning the details of the pictures. Their memories were tested with an 
interval of one week or one month. Not surprisingly, the misled participants showed 
less accurate memories than the nonmisled counterpart at both follow-ups. More 
importantly, the misled participants displayed greater suggestibility for the negative 
than positive pictures.  
Although Porter and colleagues‘ studies did not confound valence and arousal, 
they only studied valence with arousal being equated, but did not manipulate arousal 
with valence being controlled. Thus it was unable to answer questions like ―Do 
valence and arousal interact?‖ and ―What are their respective effects?‖. The current 
study was designed in response to these interests. To do so, I manipulated two levels 
of valence (negative and positive) and two levels of arousal (low and high) in a 
factorial way.  
In addition, this study had another important manipulation which has not been 
studied in the literature. Information processing takes place in association, that is, 
target information is often encoded with peripheral information. For instance, neutral 
events can occur in emotional contexts and emotional events can occur in contexts that 
are otherwise neutral. Therefore research on emotion and suggestibility should not 
only examine the effects of target emotion but also contextual emotion in a parallel 
design. In order to do so, a revised associative recognition paradigm was adopted. 
Valence and arousal were manipulated over either the context side (i.e., a 
non-emotional target with an emotional cue) or the content side (i.e., an emotional 
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target with a non-emotional cue).  
With regard to suggestibility, this study took the narrow definition and focused 
on ―Yields‖, measured by the behavior of assenting to false suggestive questions. In 
sum, the present study aimed to study (a) the effects of context valence (when context 
arousal was controlled) and those of context arousal (when context valence was 
controlled) on suggestibility, and (b) the effects of content valence (with content 
arousal being controlled) and those of content arousal (with content valence being 
controlled) on the content side, which further enabled (c) a comparison of emotion‘s 
effects on two sides.  
 
 
Method 
Subjects 
103 undergraduates at a university in the United States participated in 
exchange for course credit (mean age=19 years, 58% females).  
Material 
The International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert, 
1998) was used for emotional manipulation. In line with the bi-dimensional approach 
to emotion (Russell, 2003; Russell & Mehrabian, 1977), each picture in the IAPS was 
rated on 9-point scales of Self-Assessment Manikin (Lang, 1980) for valence and 
arousal. The valence scale ranges from positive (corresponding with the numeric value 
9) to negative (numeric value 1); and the arousal scale ranges from high 
(corresponding with the numeric value 9) to low (numeric value 1). These photos have 
been shown to elicit not only subjective and expressive changes, but also physiological 
changes involved in emotion, such as increases in heart rate, skin conductance, and 
muscle activity (Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm, 1993). Based on the normative 
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ratings of valence and arousal that are provided in the IAPS, I selected 16 
non-emotional pictures and 16 emotional pictures. The non-emotional pictures were 
neutral valence and low arousal (e.g., a neutral face, mushrooms). The emotional 
pictures fell in one out of four conditions: negative valence and high arousal (e.g., an 
attacking snake, a burned face), negative valence and low arousal (e.g., a depressed 
girl, an ill elderly), positive valence and high arousal (e.g., an athlete winning gold 
medal; innumerable money), and positive valence and low arousal (e.g., a mom 
cuddling her baby; a butterfly on a flower), with four replicates in each condition. The 
mean valence and arousal values of the pictures are reported on Table 4.1.  
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Table 4.1. Means and standard deviations of valence and arousal of pictures 
 
 Valence Arousal 
Emotion Mean SD Mean SD 
Negative Low 3.39 .48 3.57 .75 
Negative High 2.90 1.09 6.90 .41 
Positive Low 7.18 .11 3.43 .13 
Positive High 7.55 .22 6.91 .40 
Non-emotional 5.32 .17 3.34 .33 
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The selected pictures were randomly assigned and counterbalanced between 
cues and targets. On the study list, eight picture pairs were emotional cues and 
non-emotional targets, with two replicates in a 2 (cue valence: negative, positive) × 2 
(cue arousal: low, high) matrix. The other eight picture pairs were non-emotional cues 
and emotional targets, with two replicates in a 2 (target valence: negative, positive) × 
2 (target arousal: low, high) matrix. Six buffer picture pairs, selected from unused 
items in the IAPS, were presented at the beginning and end of each study list to reduce 
primacy and recency effects. The test list was composed of the old cue pictures and 
suggestive questions about the old target pictures. For each old cue-target pair in 
study, three cue-question pairs were presented for test: One had true statements about 
the old target pictures (e.g., ―There was bumper-to-bumper traffic, wasn‘t there?‖; 
―The old man was eating a pear, wasn‘t he?‖ ), and two had false statements (e.g., 
―The plan was a passenger plan, wasn‘t it?‖ when actually the plan was a fight plan; 
―Two riders in the roller coaster were wearing glasses, weren‘t they‖ when actually 
only one rider was wearing glasses).  
Procedure 
Subjects studied a list of cue-target picture pairs and responded to a 
suggestibility test. The order of picture pairs on the study and test lists was 
randomized. In the study phase, subjects were instructed that they would see a list of 
picture pairs and their memories would be tested later. They were presented with one 
set of emotional target pictures in association with non-emotional cue pictures and 
another set of non-emotional target pictures in association with emotional cue pictures. 
Each picture pair was presented for 2.5 seconds with a 0.5 second interval. After the 
learning session came a filler activity. They were asked to solve a list of mathematical 
questions as quickly and accurately as they could.  
On the suggestibility test, participants were presented with a list of 
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picture-question pairs. They were informed that the left picture in each pair was 
always the old one that they had seen on the left in the learning session, while the 
question on the right might or might not convey accurate information about the old 
picture that had previously been paired with the left picture. They were asked to 
respond to the questions on a 4-point scale (―A‖= very confidently agree, ―B‖=less 
confidently agree, ―C‖= less confidently disagree, and ―D‖= very confidently 
disagree). 15 seconds were allowed to for each question.  
Results 
Suggestibility  
The proportions of assenting to false suggestive questions (the ―A‖ and ―B‖ 
responses) were calculated for the four emotional conditions on context and content 
sides, respectively (see Table 4.2). On the context side, an analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) was conducted on the proportions of ―agree‖ responses as a function of 
context valence (negative vs. positive) and context arousal (low vs. high). There was a 
significant valence effect, F (1,102) = 8.19, MSE = .05, p < .01, indicating greater 
suggestibility in a negative context than in a positive one. However, the Valence × 
Arousal interaction was also significant, F (1,102) = 22.29, MSE = .05, p < .001. The 
post hoc analysis revealed that negative contexts increased suggestibility, relative to 
positive contexts, when the context arousal was low (t (204) = 5.39, p < .001). When 
the context arousal was high, however, there was difference between negative and 
positive valences.  
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Table 4.2. Suggestibility, confidence, and true memory as functions of emotion on 
context and content sides, respectively 
 
 Suggestibility  Confidence True Memory 
Context    
N-L .39(.24) 07(.14) .75(.32) 
N-H .33(.25) .04(.10) .52(.31) 
P-L .23(.20) .08(.10) .51(.34) 
P-H .37(.25) .11(.18) .55(.35) 
Content    
N-L .37(.26) .09(.15) 43(.37) 
N-H .33(.27) .04(.11) 43(.32) 
P-L .21(.22) .05(.12) 44(.37) 
P-H .31(.25) .11(.15) .55(.36) 
Note: N-Negative valence, P-Positive valence, L-low arousal, H-High arousal. 
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Turning to the context side, a parallel ANOVA was conducted on the 
proportions of ―agree‖ responses as a function of content valence (negative vs. 
positive) and content arousal (low vs. high). Again, there was a significant valence 
effect, F (1,102) = 14.84, MSE = .06, p < .001, and a significant Valence × Arousal 
interaction, F (1,102) = 10.80, MSE = .05, p < .001. The participants yielded to 
misleading questions more frequently for negative targets than positive ones, when the 
content arousal was low (t (204) = 5.36, p < .001). No difference between negative 
and positive valences when the arousal was high.  
Confidence Ratings 
I further examined the confidence levels of the participants when they yielded 
to false suggestive questions: Did certain emotion make them more confident? The 
proportions of the high confidence rating (―A‖ = very confidently agree; see also, 
Moritz & Steffen, 2002) as a function of context valence (negative vs. positive) and 
context arousal (low vs. high) were calculated. Valence had significant effect, F 
(1,102) = 8.21, MSE = .02, p < .01. The high confidence rating was given more often 
in a positive context than in a negative context. In addition, the Valence × Arousal 
interaction was also significant, F (1,102) = 5.11, MSE = .02, p < .05. That is, when 
the cue picture was at high level of arousal, positive valence increased confidence than 
negative valence (t (204) = 3.58, p < .001); whereas when the cue picture was at low 
level of arousal, confidence levels did not vary with valence. 
A similar ANOVA was conducted on the proportions of the high confidence 
rating as a function of content valence (negative vs. positive) and content arousal (low 
vs. high). The main effects of valence and arousal were not significant, but the 
Valence × Arousal interaction was (F (1,102) = 23.76, MSE = .01, p < .001). When the 
target picture was at high level of arousal, positive valence increased confidence than 
negative valence (t (204) = 3.88, p < .001); whereas when the target picture was at low 
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level of arousal, negative valence increased confidence than positive valence (t (204) = 
2.38, p < .05).  
Discussion 
In this study, I manipulated valence and arousal factorially over context and 
content sides. The findings indicated that both the emotional characteristics of the 
target images and those of the contextual images had important impacts on 
suggestibility. That is, negative valence increased suggestibility when arousal was 
low, but not so when arousal was high. This valence-by-arousal interaction was 
observed on both the context and content sides.  
However, different processes may underlie the effect. To explore this, two sets 
of analysis were conducted. First, I compared the proportions of ―agree‖ responses to 
false suggestive questions and those to true questions. Considering emotion on the 
context side, the subjects made more ―Yield‖ responses to both false and true 
information in the negative, low-arousal context than in any other emotional contexts, 
indicating that the negative, low-arousal context promoted individuals‘ tendency of 
compliance, regardless of the truthfulness of the statements. Turning to emotion on the 
content side, however, the negative, low-arousal content had the highest proportions of 
assenting to false suggestive questions but the lowest proportions of assenting to true 
questions. It suggested that the effect of the negative, low-arousal content was related 
more likely to inhibited memory than an elevated tendency of compliance.  
This interpretation was further supported by the second set of analyses on 
confidence ratings. It is interesting that although the negative, low-arousal context 
heightened suggestibility, it did not make the subjects more confident with their 
―Yield‖ choice. That is, although they were not very confident to give in to false 
suggestions, they did so anyway. In contrast, the negative, low-arousal content 
promoted both suggestibility and confidence, suggesting that memory was likely 
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impaired. Thus, the results suggested that the increased suggestibility for negative, low 
arousal content was associated with memory impairment, whereas the increased 
suggestibility in a negative, low arousal context was related to compliance.  
As a matter of fact, the dissociative patterns between content and context are 
supported by previous studies. With respect to the target side, the literature has 
compellingly revealed that suggestibility is negatively related to memory (Liebman, 
McKinley-Pace, Leonard, Sheesley, Gallant, Renkey, & Lehman, 2002) and source 
monitoring (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). Furthermore, memory and source 
monitoring are more likely to be impaired for negative valence (e.g., Brainerd, Stein, 
Silveira, Rohenkohl, & Reyna, 2008; Maratos, Allen, & Rugg, 2000; Maddock & 
Frein, 2009; El Sharkawy, Groth, Vetter, Beraldi, & Fast, 2008). It is primarily 
because false memory relies heavily on interconnected associative structures (Brainerd 
& Reyna, 2005; Gallo, 2006), and negative emotional information is indeed more 
semantically dense and highly interrelated in memory (Talmi, Luk, McGarry, & 
Moscovitch, 2007; Talmi & Moscovitsch, 2004). That is, negative content is 
associated with impaired memory, which in turn is related to increased suggestibility; 
therefore, it was not surprising to observe higher suggestibility for negative content.  
Turning to the context side, it is intriguing that, although context in this study 
referred to contextual stimulus, which is very different from moods (mental context), 
the findings in this study are consistent with those in mood manipulation studies. For 
example, some previous research (e.g., Goodman, Quas, Batterman-Faunce, 
Riddlesberger, & Kuhn, 1994; Levine, Burgess, & Laney, 2008) examined discrete 
emotions such as sadness (negative, low-arousal) and happiness (positive, 
high-arousal). Their results compellingly demonstrated that sadness influenced one to 
be particularly vulnerable to suggestion, relative to other emotions. Such effect is 
consistent with appraisal theory that discrete emotions lead to different cognitive and 
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interpersonal problem-solving strategies (e.g., Frijda, 1987; Keltner & Gross, 1999; 
Scherer, 2003; Smith & Lazarus, 1993): Happiness is associated with goal attainment, 
which signals that no diversion of cognitive resources is necessary (Schwarz & Clore, 
1983) and evokes feelings of self-efficacy (Izard & Ackerman, 2000). 
Correspondingly, memory retrieval is facilitated (for a review, see Isen, 2000) and 
individuals are less likely to give in to misleading information (Ceci & Bruck, 1993). 
In contrast, sadness is associated with a sense of irrevocable failure, the belief that 
one‘s own resources are inadequate, and thus the tendency of seeking help and 
comfort from others (Izard & Ackerman, 2000). Thus, sadness leads to feelings of low 
self-efficacy and increased reliance on others for help with a predicament (Saarni, 
1997).  
The current study has implications for the law, where memory reports are the 
most important form of evidence (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005; Ceci & Friedman, 2000). 
Crimes are highly emotionally charged events. Through interviews and testimony, 
requested memories can be information which itself is emotional or which is cued by 
other emotional information, and the retrieval process is often contaminated by 
suggestive questioning and misinformation. Therefore, the question of how 
suggestibility is affected by emotional content as well as by emotional context is of 
special interest.  
  91 
REFERENCES 
Belli, R. F. (1989). Influences of misleading postevent information: Misinformation 
interference and acceptance. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 
118, 72-85. 
Brainerd, C. J., & Reyna, V. F. (2005). The Science of False Memory. New York: 
Oxford University Press.  
Brainerd, C. J., Stein, L. M., Silveira, R. A., Rohenkohl, G., & Reyna, V. (2008). How 
Does Negative Emotion Cause False Memories? Psychological Science, 19, 
919-925.  
Bruck, M. & Ceci, S. J. (1997). The Suggestibility of Young Children. Current 
Directions in Psychological Science, 6, 75-79. 
Bruck, M. & Ceci, S. J. (1999). The suggestibility of children‘s memory. Annual 
Reviews of Psychology, 50, 419-439. 
Bruck, M., & Melnyk, L. (2004). Individual differences in children‘s suggestibility: A 
review and synthesis. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 18, 947–996. 
Ceci, S. J. & Bruck, M. (1993). The suggestibility of children's recollections: An 
historical review and synthesis. Psychological Bulletin, 113, 403-439.  
Ceci, S. J., Loftus, E. F., Leichtman, M., & Bruck, M. (1994). The possible role of 
source misattributions in the creation of false beliefs among preschoolers. 
International Journal of Clinical & Experimental Hypnosis, 42, 304-320. 
El Sharkawy, J., Groth, K., Vetter, C., Beraldi, A., & Fast, K. (2008). False memories 
of emotional and neutral words. Behavioral Neurology, 19, 7-11. 
Frijda, N. H. (1987). Emotion, cognitive structure, and action tendency. Cognition and 
Emotion, 1, 115–143. 
Gallo DA. 2006. Associative illusions of memory: false memory research in DRM and 
related tasks. New York: Psychology Press. 
  92 
Goodman, G. S., Bottoms, B. L., Schwartz-Kenney, B., & Rudy, L. (1991). Children's 
testimony for a stressful event: Improving children's reports. Journal of 
Narrative and Life History, 1, 69-99. 
Goodman, G. S., Hirshman, J. Hepps, D. & Rudy, L. (1991). Children's memory for 
stressful events. MerrillPalmer Quarterly, 37, 109-158. 
Goodman, G. S., Quas, J. A., Batterman-Faunce, J. M., Riddlesberger, M. M., & 
Kuhn, J. (1994). Predictors of accurate and inaccurate memories of traumatic 
events experienced in childhood. Consciousness and Cognition, 3, 269–294. 
Gudjonsson, G. H. (1984). A new scale of interrogative suggestibility. Personality and 
Individual Differences, 5, 303–314. 
Gudjonsson, G. (1986). The relationship between interrogative suggestibility and 
acquiescence: Empirical findings and theoretical implications. Personality and 
Individual Differences, 7, 195-199. 
Hyman, I. E., Husband, T. H. & Billings, F. J. (1995). False memories of childhood 
experiences. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 9, 181-197. 
Isen, A. M. (2000). Some perspectives on positive affect and self regulation. 
Psychological Inquiry, 11, 184–187. 
Izard, C. E., & Ackerman, B. P. (2000). Motivational, organizational, and regulatory 
functions of discrete emotions. In M. Lewis & J. H. Haviland-Jones (Eds.), 
Handbook of emotions (2nd ed., pp. 253–264). New York: Guilford Press. 
Johnson, M. K., Hashtroudi, S., & Lindsay, D. S. (1993). Source monitoring. 
Psychological Bulletin, 11, 3–28. 
Keltner, D., & Gross, J. J. (1999). Functional accounts of emotions. Cognition & 
Emotion, 13, 467–480. 
Lang, P. J. (1980). Behavioral treatment and bio-behavioral assessment: computer 
applications. In J. B. Sidowski, J. H. Johnson, & T. A. Williams (Eds.), 
  93 
Technology in mental health care delivery systems (pp. 119-l37). Norwood, 
NJ: Ablex. 
Lang, P. J., Bradley, M. M., & Cuthbert, B. N. (1998). International affective pictures 
system (IAPS): Digitized photographs, instruction manual and affective ratings 
(Tech. Rep. A-6). Gainesville: University of Florida, NIMH Center for the 
Study of Emotion and Attention. 
Lang, P. J., Greenwald, M. K., Bradley, M. M., & Hamm, A. O. (1993). Looking at 
pictures: Affective, facial, visceral, and behavioral reactions. 
Psychophysiology, 30, 261-273.  
Levine, L. J. (1996). The anatomy of disappointment: A naturalistic test of appraisal 
models of sadness, anger, and hope. Cognition & Emotion, 10, 337–359. 
Levine, L. J., Burgess, S., & Laney, C. (2008). Effects of discrete emotions on young 
children's suggestibility. Developmental Psychology, 44, 681-694. 
Liebman, J. I., McKinley-Pace, M. J., Leonard, A. M., Sheesley, L. A., Gallant, C. L., 
Renkey, M. E., & Lehman, E. B. (2002). Cognitive and psychosocial correlates 
of adults' eyewitness accuracy and suggestibility. Personality and Individual 
Differences, 33, 49-66. 
Lindsay, D. S. (1990). Misleading suggestions can impair eyewitnesses' ability to 
remember event details. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, and Cognition, 16, 1077-1083.  
Loftus, E. F. (1979). Eyewitness testimony. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press.  
Maddock, R. J., & Frein, S. T. (2009). Reduced memory for the spatial and temporal 
context of unpleasant words. Cognition & Emotion, 23, 96-117. 
Maratos, E. J., Allan, K., & Rugg, M. D. (2000). Recognition memory for emotionally 
negative and neutral words: An ERP Study. Neuropsychologia, 38, 1452-1465.  
  94 
Merritt, K. A., Ornstein, P. A., & Spicker, B. (1994). Children's memory for a salient 
medical procedure: implications for testimony. Pediatrics. 94, 17-23. 
Moritz, S. & Steffen, T. S. (2002). Memory confidence and false memories in 
schizophrenia. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 9, 641-643. 
Otgaar, H., Candel, I., & Merckelbach, H. (2008). Children‘ false memories: Easier to 
elicit for a negative than for a neutral event. Acta Psychologica, 128, 350-354. 
Peters, D. P. (1991). The influence of stress and arousal on the child witness. In J. L. 
Doris (Ed.), The suggestibility of children’s recollections (pp. 60–76). 
Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 
Russell, J. A. (2003). Core affect and the psychological construction of emotion. 
Psychological Review, 110, 145–172. 
Russell, J. A., & Mehrabian, A. (1977). Evidence for a three-factor theory of 
emotions. Journal of Research in Personality, 11, 273-294.  
Saarni, C. (1997). Coping with aversive feelings. Motivation & Emotion, 21, 45–63. 
Scherer, K. R. (2003). Cognitive components of emotion. In R. J. Davidson, H. 
Goldsmith, & K. R. Scherer (Eds.), Handbook of the affective sciences (pp. 
563–571). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Schwarz, N., & Clore, G. L. (1983). Mood, misattribution, and judgments of 
well-being: Informative and directive functions of affective states. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 45, 513–523. 
Smith, C. A., & Lazarus, R. S. (1993). Appraisal components, core relational theories, 
and the emotions. Cognition & Emotion, 7, 233–269. 
Talmi, D., & Moscovitsch, M. (2004). Can semantic relatedness explain the 
enhancement of memory for emotional words? Memory & Cognition, 32, 
742–751. 
Talmi, D., Luk, B., McGarry, L., & Moscovitch, M. (2007). The contribution of 
  95 
relatedness and distinctiveness to emotionally-enhanced memory. Journal of 
Memory and Language, 56, 555–574. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  96 
CHAPTER 5 
 
Was the Good That Good? 
–––– Positive Bias of Past Performance 
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Abstract 
Previous research has indicated that false memory in general is related to gist process, 
whereas memory distortions of autobiographical events are related to the self system. 
Taken together, the current experiment examined positive bias of past performance as 
a function of gist (i.e., whether the performance was positively evaluated) and the self 
(i.e., whether the performance was perceived irrelevant to, consistent with, or 
inconsistent with one‘s current active goal). Students participated in an academic test; 
three weeks later, they took a surprise memory test on their memories for the previous 
performance. They exhibited a general tendency to reconstruct false positive details, 
through recalling being correct on more test items than they actually did. This positive 
bias was especially strong when the test result was positively evaluated or when good 
performance was consistent with goal achievement. Gist was influential in the 
situation where the test was irrelevant to the self; in situations where the performance 
was relevant (including consistent and inconsistent), however, positive bias varied 
primarily with perceived impacts of the past performance on the self: positive bias was 
strong in the consistent condition (regardless of evaluation), but restricted in the 
inconsistent condition (especially in the presence of positive evaluation). 
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Was the good that good? 
–––– Positive bias of past performance 
Since the pioneering work of Bartlett (1932), research has compellingly 
revealed the inherently reconstructive nature of episodic memory and its proneness to 
distortions (e.g., Garry & Wade, 2005; Reyna, 2000). False memory for impersonal 
stimuli is conceptualized from a dual-processes perspective –– a gist-like conceptual 
process and a verbatim-level perceptual process, and thus understanding false memory 
to be the combat between these two processes (e.g., Brainerd & Reyna, 2002, 2005). 
Theories on autobiographical events (e.g., Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway, 
2005), on the other hand, maintain a self-memory bidirectional model, argue that 
memories provide context for the self and the self system exercises control over 
memories, and ascribe memory distortions to self-serving motives (e.g., Ross & 
Buehler, 2001). In the current study, we are interested in how the cognitive effect of 
gist and the motivational effect of self work together on positive bias in 
autobiographical memory: Do individuals reconstruct false positive memory details of 
their past performance? Does it depend on whether the performance has been 
evaluated as ―good‖, or how important the past performance means to the current self, 
or both? Some background on the effects of gist and self on false memory, 
respectively, is provided before reporting our research. 
Gist and False Memory 
Gist is an important concept (fuzzy-trace theory; Brainerd & Reyna, 2002, 
2005) in understanding memory falsification in general. According to the theory, 
humans have two kinds of memory representations: verbatim representations that 
record surface-level sensory details, and gist representations that represent general 
interpretations, meanings, patterns and relations. Retrieval of verbatim traces is a vivid 
form of remembering in which one consciously re-experiences previous events and 
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specific contexts. It protects memory from distortions. By contrast, retrieval of gist 
traces is a more generic form of remembering, which allows inaccurate information to 
slip in recollection. Importantly, verbatim traces are susceptible to interference and 
fade out quickly over time, whereas gist traces are robust and endurable. As the 
accessibility of verbatim traces is reduced, gist traces dominate consolidation, 
reconstruction, and recollection of memory. Correspondingly, a process known as 
phantom recollection occurs, where false but gist-consistent details are recalled or 
recognized (Brainerd, Payne, Wright, & Reyna, 2003; Brainerd, Wright, Reyna, & 
Mojardin, 2001).  
Such gist-driven false memories have been observed in a variety of situations, 
including word learning (e.g., Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995; 
Underwood, 1965), sentence and story memory (e.g., Reyna & Kiernan, 1994), 
memory of faces (e.g., Reinitz & Hannigan, 2001), memory of eyewitness (e.g., 
Lindsay & Johnson, 1989), and memory for naturalistic scenes (e.g., Lampinen, 
Copeland, & Neuschatz, 2001). The literature converged to the finding that when a 
substantial amount of verbatim traces have faded, individuals fill in memory gaps 
based on the gist (Bergman & Roediger, 1999; Spiro, 1980). 
The subtype of gist we are interested in current study is evaluation. Evaluation 
is a positive or negative assessment of a stimulus, which has a particularly salient 
affective component in addition to its cognitive component (Ferguson, 2007). 
Correspondingly, evaluation is processed faster than plain cognitive information 
(Duckworth, Bargh, Garcia, & Chaiken, 2002; Murphy & Zajonc, 1993), and exhibits 
a slower forgetting rate that outlasts when other memory details have already been 
forgotten (Koriat, Levy-Sadot, Edry, & de Marcas, 2003; Zajonc, 1980). As a result, 
people give significant weight to their evaluation of things, recall consistent 
information accurately and display evaluation-congruent distortion (Hirt, McDonald, 
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& Erickson, 1995). In a word, it is not surprising that we sometimes report past events 
in a way that diverges from historical reality in order to better match the overall 
evaluation of the events.  
Self Goal and False Memory  
As James Mill (1869) wrote, ―The phenomenon of Self and that of Memory are 
merely two sides of the same fact, or two different modes of viewing the same fact. ... 
…This succession of feelings, which I call my memory of the past, is that by which I 
distinguish my Self‖ (p. 174). The modern theory Self Memory System (SMS; 
Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway, 2005) follows the line of the 
interconnectedness between memory and self. It argues that autobiographical memory 
is not an experience-near record of ongoing events because memory is subject to the 
control of the self and often biased in favor of the self. According to the SMS, self is 
conceived as a set of goals with associated self-images, collectively referred to as the 
working self. The goals are organized in a highly complex goal-sub-goal hierarchy. At 
a given time, some subset of the goal structure is more active than others. The purpose 
of the goal hierarchy is to reduce discrepancies between active goal and the current 
status. To achieve this, the goal hierarchy operates as a gateway, selecting what new 
knowledge to enter long-term memory, what preexisting knowledge to be accessed, 
and what memories to be constructed. Therefore, memories can be altered, distorted, 
even fabricated, to support the current active goal of the self.  
In general, autobiographical memory is subject to the self‘s motive to maintain 
and enhance the positivity of one‘s self-concept (Greenwald, 1980; Sedikides & 
Strube, 1997), and its motive to maintain a coherent and stable self and self-world 
interaction that extend beyond the present moment (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; 
Conway, 2005). As a consequence, individuals remember their past performance 
better than it was in reality (Crary, 1966), not only when they are unaware of their 
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objective standings (Dunning, Heath, & Suls, 2004) but also after they have been 
informed of the precise values of their scores (Gramzow & Willard, 2006; Willard 
&Gramzow, 2008). They also recall past events as having been more positive than 
they initially felt about the events (Christensen, Wood, & Barrett, 2003). Moreover, 
they preferentially recall positive events but ignore or forget negative self-relevant 
information (Sedikides & Green, 2000; Walker, Skowronski, & Thompson, 2003). 
When there is doubt about certain specifics of one‘s past, there is a tendency to form 
lofty recollections of those specifics (Greenwald, 1980). 
Interestingly, although Western individuals generally overestimate the 
objective quality of their past performance as aforementioned, sometimes they may 
not. According to temporal self-appraisal theory (Ross & Wilson, 2003; Wilson & 
Ross, 2001), individuals would not overestimate their performance if doing so makes 
present achievement pale by comparison. Rather, they would recall their past in a way 
so that makes them feel good about their current self or fulfills their need of perceiving 
the self as a continuously improving agent. For instance, they may downplay a past 
self to make current self more appealing, through exaggerating the improvement from 
the past. Thus, whether one has positive bias for the past is associated with his 
perceived impacts of the past achievement on the current self.  
The Present Study 
Note memory distortions in general are associated with people‘s reliance on 
the theme or impression of the experience (e.g., gist), whereas memory distortions for 
autobiographical events are related with the self. Taken together, what are the relative 
effects of the self and gist on positive bias? This question has not been studied and is 
the focus of the present experiment. Here, we manipulated both gist and self goal in a 
factorial design. For gist, we compared a situation which provided positive evaluation 
after performance with another that did not provide evaluation. The effect of self-goal 
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was examined across a situation where the performance was irrelevant to a current 
active goal (irrelevant), a situation where good performance would directly reinforce 
goal achievement (consistent), and a situation where good performance would work 
against the goal achievement (inconsistent).  
Our memory outcome was different than previous studies on positive bias that 
looked at recall of overall scores (e.g., Willard & Gramzow, 2008). We examined 
false positive memory details. This was done by asking participants to recall their 
answers to individual test items and measuring the amount of falsely recalling one had 
chosen correct answers when actually not. That is, we examined memory distortion at 
a more process level: Can memory details be distorted under the impacts of gist and 
self goal?  
Based on the prior research, we expected that both the gist and self goal 
manipulation would have significant effects on reconstructing positive memory 
details. Pertaining to the gist effect, we hypothesized that participants receiving 
positive evaluation would report more false positive details than those receiving no 
evaluation. Pertaining to the self effect, in the absence of positive evaluation, 
participants in the consistent condition would report more false positive details than 
those in the irrelevant or inconsistent condition. We did not have specific hypothesis 
to the interaction effect between self and gist.  
METHOD 
Participants   
A total of 139 undergraduate students (78% female, ages 18-24) from a 
University at the East Coast participated. The recruitment advertisement clearly 
indicated that only students who had interests in pursuing a PhD in Psychology were 
invited for this study. Students participated in exchange for extra course credits. 
Participant age and gender did not influence the results. 
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Material   
We selected 30 GRE in Psychology Subject test items from the Princeton 
Review and online resources. All those test items were originally designed to test 
college students‘ comprehensive knowledge on Psychology. All test items were 
multiple choice formats, and students were instructed to choose one best answer from 
five options.  
Procedure   
We manipulated two levels of gist (positive evaluation vs. no evaluation) and 
three levels of self goal (irrelevant, consistent, or inconsistent), yielding six conditions. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the six conditions. All participants 
completed a test booklet with 30 test items in small groups. Depending on the 
assignment of self goal conditions, different versions of ―the purpose of the test‖ were 
provided at the beginning part of test booklet. For students in the irrelevant self goal 
condition, the stated purpose of the test was phrased as irrelevant to their competency 
and goal pursuit: The test was one of the first trials in an attempt to develop a new 
pool of exam items for a testing agency. Students were thanked for their contribution. 
For self goal consistent and self goal inconsistent conditions, the stated purpose of the 
test, however, was phrased as highly relevant to their competency and goal pursuit: 
Some professors from a Psychology program in the Ivy League universities were 
organizing a special program, in which they would provide selected students with 
pre-graduate school trainings, research opportunities, and recommendations on behalf 
of the students. They were interested in students who got the highest scores on this 
exam. The test had been used among top colleges and universities and proved to be a 
very sensitive and effective measure of knowledge and potential. Students were 
encouraged to try their best and to become a candidate of the program. Other test 
instructions were otherwise the same. They were asked to select the one response that 
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was best in each case and then fill in the corresponding space on the answer sheet. A 
maximum of 30 minutes was allowed to complete the test. 
All the participants were contacted three weeks later with a surprise memory 
test. Each received an individualized letter with his/her name on it, but the content on 
test purpose and performance evaluation differed among six conditions. For those in 
the self goal irrelevant condition, half received a positive evaluation, and the other half 
received no evaluation. The letter in the positive evaluation condition first reminded 
the students that they took a GRE Subject test to help a testing agency develop exam 
items, then provided grading information (―The grading criteria were poor, below 
average, average, above average, and outstanding.‖) and the student‘s grade (―What 
you have got is outstanding.‖). The letter in the no-gist condition simply restated the 
purpose of the test, without the information on grading criteria or students‘ grades. 
In the self goal consistent condition, the letter restated that the purpose of the 
previous test was to select students for privileged opportunities. In the self goal 
inconsistent condition, however, the letter alerted the participants that ―The selection 
will involve a second test to be scheduled in three weeks. What the examiners think 
highest of is the increase in scores between the tests, which indicates the competency 
of continuing improvement. That is, progress between the tests will be highly valued, 
whereas regress or no progress will be considered disadvantageous.‖ In the following 
paragraph of the letter, students in both conditions received either positive feedback or 
no feedback. 
After reading the letter, all the participants were given a surprise memory test. 
They were provided with a copy of the original test they took three weeks ago. 
However, the answer key to each question was included. They were asked to recall 
carefully which answer they previously selected for each of the questions. The 
participants were debriefed after their participation.  
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RESULTS 
For each participant, we graded his/her original response to each test item in 
the first session, and compared them to his/her retrieval in the second session. There 
were five potential relations between the retrieval and the original responses (see 
Table 5.1). Three were false memories: (a) one chose an incorrect answer on the test 
but recalled s/he had chosen a correct one (over-report); (b) one chose a correct 
answer on the test but recalled s/he had chosen an incorrect one (under-report); and 
(c) one chose an incorrect answer in the test but recalled s/he had chosen another 
incorrect one (neutral-change). Among them, the over-report measured the extent of 
constructing unrealistically positive memories and thus was the focus of our analysis. 
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Table 5.1. Relations between the actual responses and the retrievals  
 
Relation              Response in session 1        Retrieval in the session 2 
Correct retrieval        Correct                    Correct  
Correct retrieval        Incorrect                   Same incorrect  
Over-report            Incorrect                   Correct  
Under-report           Correct                    Incorrect  
Neutral change         Incorrect                   Different incorrect  
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In general, as many as 99.4% of the participants made at least one over-report; 
82.3% of the participants made at least one neutral change; and only 74.1% of the 
participants made at least one under-report. We conducted a 3 self-goal (irrelevant, 
consistent, inconsistent) × 2 gist (positive, no) between-subjects analysis of covariance 
(ANCOVA) on over-report. Three variables were included as covariates to remove 
confounding effects (Wilkinson, Hill, & Vang, 1992): To account for individual 
differences in memory failure, we included the counts of neutral-change and 
under-report as covariates. In addition, the total of correct answers in the first session 
(total-correct) was also a covariate because it was related to over-report (for instance, 
one who got full points in the first session would have no possibility for over-report). 
Because the memory variables were count data and positively skewed (except 
total-correct was normally distributed), they were submitted to square root 
transformations. The square-rooted neutral-change and square-rooted total-correct 
were significant covariates, but not the square-rooted under-report. Thus the ANOVA 
rerun with the square-rooted under-report excluded (SYSTAT, 1992). All F values 
reported below have the effects of the covariates controlled.  
The main effect of self goal was significant, F(2, 131) = 6.90, MSE = .42, p < 
.001. Participants who regarded the test consistent with their goal pursuit modified 
performance on more items from incorrect to correct (M = 2.47, SD = .86) than 
participants who regarded good performance on the test a threat to the goal 
achievement (M = 2.27, SD = .99) or irrelevant to the self (M = 2.37, SD = .70) did. 
The main effect of gist was also significant, F(1, 131) = 4.91, MSE = .42, p < .05, 
indicating that participants who received positive feedback (M = 2.52, SD = .81) 
modified performance on more items from incorrect to correct than participants who 
received no feedback (M = 2.26, SD = .85).  
The interaction was marginally significant, F(2, 131) = 2.98, MSE = .42, p = 
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.05 (see Figure 5.1). Participants in the self goal consistent condition always reported 
the most over-report among the three self condition groups, no matter the positive 
evaluation was provided or not. Then we will then use self goal consistent condition as 
a reference level to further illustrate the interaction effect. In the absence of positive 
evaluation, participants in self goal irrelevant condition reported significantly less 
over-report than those in self goal consistent condition, t(40) = 3.74, SE = .21, p < 
.001. When positive evaluation was provided, however, participants in the irrelevant 
condition reported the same amount of over-report as participants in the consistent 
condition, t(43) = 1.15, SE = .22. When self goal consistent and inconsistent 
conditions were compared, no significant difference in over-report was observed when 
no evaluation was provided, t(50) = 1.54, SE = .19. Interestingly, given the positive 
gist, over-report of the inconsistent condition significantly dropped from that of the 
consistent condition, t(55) = 2.71, SE = .18, p < .01. Positive gist did not facilitate but 
rather prohibited the over report when good performance was perceived as a threat to 
the goal achievement.  
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Figure 5.1. Square-rooted counts of over-report as a function of evaluative gist 
(no-gist, positive-gist) and self goal (irrelevant, consistent, and inconsistent) 
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DISCUSSIONS 
We are interested in positive bias of past performance as a function of gist and 
self goal. The overall results are: (a) individuals tended to reconstruct false positive 
details in their memory of past performance; (b) the positive bias was especially 
boosted when the performance had been positively evaluated or (c) if the performance 
was meaningful for one‘s capacity and beneficial to the self-goal; (d) however, the 
positive bias was restricted if good performance was a potential threat to the goal 
pursuit.  
The robust effect of positive evaluation indicated that the gist of how well one 
has performed could contaminate the verbatim memory (i.e., episodic details) of one‘s 
performance. As suggested by fuzzy-trace theory (Brainerd & Reyna, 2002, 2005), the 
gist representations sustain when the verbatim traces fade. The waning of verbatim 
traces results in memory gaps, which people have a tendency to fill in accordance with 
the gist. During the retrieval process, gist-consistent false details are constructed, and 
even information that violates the gist is distorted to be more consistent with the gist 
than it really had been (Cohen, 1981; Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975; Greenwald, 1980; 
Hirt, Erickson, & McDonald, 1993; Ross, 1989; Ross & Buehler, 1994, 2001; 
Schacter, 1996; Singer & Salovey, 1993; Wilson & Ross, 2001). Because biases are 
more pronounced for abstract traits (e.g., ability) than for concrete attributes (e.g., 
specific grades), the more times people recall at an abstract gist level how positive 
their past was, the more likely they are to make up incorrect details (Wells & Sweeny, 
1986). One interesting thing to note is that the positive feedback in our experiment 
was arbitrarily assigned independent to the students‘ actual performance. However, it 
still had a significant effect in biasing their verbatim-level recall. This is in line with 
previous findings that people are sensitive to and adept at making use of external 
information as evidence to pursue a positive feeling for the self (e.g., Kunda, 1987; 
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Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987). 
On the other hand, our results highlighted that self goal plays a substantial role 
in autobiographical memory reconstruction. Research in social cognition has 
consistently demonstrated that the self functions as a cognitive prototype that biases 
the processing of any personally-related information (see Kuiper & Derry, 1980, for a 
review). It is worth noting that although gist imposed impact on positive bias for the 
irrelevant condition, the impact was much limited for the consistent and inconsistent 
conditions. The consistent and inconsistent condition –– both are highly self –relevant 
–– responded primarily to the manipulation of self-goal. That is, to what extent one 
displays positive bias depends on his/her perceived relationship between the past 
performance and the current active goal, regardless of gist manipulation. This is 
supported by McDonald and Hirt‘s (1997) notion that although evaluative beliefs lead 
to the distortion of memories when one harbors no specific motivation and when one 
is motivated to confirm the evaluative beliefs, it is not the case when one is motivated 
to disconfirm them. The self ignores the external information if it is not self-serving. 
For example, in Gramzow and Willard‘s (2006), 38% of the participants receiving 
negative feedback (―poor‖) overestimated their performance anyway. These 
participants might be skilled at interpreting and recalling negative feedback in a 
self-protective manner (Brown & Dutton, 1995), or dwell on their strengths rather than 
weaknesses following disappointments (Steele, Spencer, & Lynch, 1993). Regardless, 
it suggested that autobiographical memory is shaped according to the need of the self 
more than in response to the gist.  
In summary, memory is influenced in powerful ways by external and internal 
factors. Evaluation, in the current study, is an external factor. It modifies memory 
details to be aligned with the evaluation. On the other hand, the current active goal of 
the self is an internal factor. Although memory reconstruction may be beyond 
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awareness, it is hardly ―unintentional‖. On top of the influence of gist, 
autobiographical memory distortions are primarily driven by the self: The more 
relevant an event is to the self, the more likely its memory details will be 
reconstructed; and the more beneficial a good performance is to one‘s goal pursuit, the 
more likely the memory details will be positively biased. In the situation where good 
performance works against goal achievement, however, positive bias will be 
restricted; and the more salient the positive evaluation is, the more restricted the 
positive bias will be. 
Implications 
There are certain things in our lives that remembering them is a joy: although 
the details may be foggy, our impression is distinctly positive. For many of these 
events, we will never have a chance to experience them again; whereas for others that 
we do have a chance, we somehow feel that the re-experienced are not as good as the 
previously experienced. Such ―not that good‖ experiences make us wonder: Do we 
exaggerate the positivity in mind? As suggested by our study, we sometimes do but 
sometimes not.  
When we do, the biased memories not only provide us with a constrained 
interpretation of our past, but also have behavioral consequences. Although it could be 
adaptive to have sweet memories of the past, it could also be maladaptive. People not 
only believe in their false memories, but also act on the basis of these memories 
(Loftus, 2003). The exaggerated sweet memories could form a distorted reference for 
social comparison and decision making, invoke excessive feeling of nostalgia, and 
impede us from enjoying the present, exploring new opportunities, and striving for a 
better future. By knowing that we tend to exaggerate how good the past was under the 
influence of self goal and the gist attached to the experience, we may want to be 
careful with our nostalgic feelings. Fortunately, being aware of a potential threat that a 
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past achievement may have on a goal pursuit and our current/future well-being 
appears to enable us to moderate the distortion.  
Our findings yield new support for the self-enhancing bias rooted in North 
American culture, which however are not universal. People in the Eastern culture (e.g., 
the Japanese) are more self-critical (Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999), 
highly responsive to failure feedback (Heine, Kitayama, & Lehman, 2001), and have 
larger actual-ideal self-discrepancies (Heine & Lehman, 1999). Therefore, an 
interesting future study can look at how the self and gist processing affect positive bias 
in the Eastern culture. 
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Now to address the questions concerning false memory and emotion, does 
emotion of memory targets have different effects than emotion of retrieval contexts? 
Yes. The context vs. content manipulation is especially important for studying 
arousal‘s effects. Furthermore, do emotional valence and arousal increase semantic 
false recognition, orthographical false recognition, and suggestibility? And how, at a 
process level, does emotion influence these false memories? The finding of overriding 
significance is that negative valence, when disentangled from arousal, suppresses true 
memory and elevates false memory, resulting in a declined net accuracy. At a more 
fundamental level, negative valence dilutes verbatim processes and stimulates gist 
processes. These findings are consistent with FTT and empirical data that (a) valence 
is a conceptual property, and negative valence is an especially salient gist (Brainerd, 
Stein, Silveira, Rohenkohl, & Reyna, 2008a), and (b) negative valence also impairs the 
ability to use verbatim traces of true experience to suppress distortions (Brainerd, et 
al., 2008).  
It is worth noting that our recent study (Brainerd, Holliday, Reyna, Yang, 
Toglia, in press) further investigated the developmental trajectory of the effect‘s 
emotion on false memory. We administered the Cornell/Cortland Emotion Lists (CEL; 
Brainerd, Yang, Toglia, Reyna, & Stahl, 2008b), a word pool that induces false 
memory and that allows factorial manipulation of valence and arousal, to children, 
adolescents, and adults. Significant developmental reversals were obtained. With three 
age groups (7, 11, 20), false memory increased with age at a greater speed than true 
memory. More importantly, the negative valence effects, which were the same as 
those in the current study, waxed with age. These developmental trends are consistent 
with findings in brain development of later-maturing prefrontal regions between early 
childhood and adolescence (Paz-Alonso, Ghetti, Donohue, Goodman, & Bunge, 2009) 
as well as cognitive development of clustering and connecting individual items that 
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share similarities (e.g., Bjorklund & Jacobs, 1985). Considering that cognitive 
capacity is necessary to make links between cues and targets, it may be interesting to 
study whether the effects of contextual emotion will increase with age as well. 
Another recommendation for future study on false memory and emotion is 
cultural difference. Western culture encourages expression of emotion, whereas 
Eastern culture tends to value regulating emotion and maintaining more control. Thus, 
negative emotion is generally repressed, which is a widely accepted cultural goal 
(Wang, 2003). However, the unconscious mind is more powerful in bringing out 
impulsive behaviors than the conscious mind. Therefore pervasiveness of emotional 
suppression may lead to memory effects, especially distortion effects, which are 
culturally distinct from those that have been observed with Western subjects.  
Turning to false memory and the self, what are the effects of the self and gist 
processing on positive bias of autobiographical memory? Both are effective, but each 
dominant in different situations, depending on the perceived relations between the past 
event and the current active goal of the working self. The findings yield new support 
for the positive self-regard and self-enhancing biases rooted in North American 
culture, which however are not universal. People in the Eastern culture (e.g., the 
Japanese) are more self-critical (Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999), highly 
responsive to failure feedback (Heine, Kitayama, & Lehman, 2001), and have larger 
actual-ideal self-discrepancies (Heine & Lehman, 1999). Therefore, an interesting 
future study can look at how the self and gist processing affect positive bias in the 
Eastern culture. 
One main limitation of the current studies is that we have not investigated 
long-term effects (over periods of days, weeks, and months); these effects of emotion 
are particularly important in the law, medicine, and psychotherapy because there are 
normally extensive delays between the time events happened and the time they are 
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retrieved. Another limitation is that the experimental materials we have used are 
emotional words and pictures, which are less complex and less self-involved than 
real-life events (e.g., trauma, crimes). The tradeoff here is that word and picture norms 
allow precise manipulations of emotional attributes. Noteworthy, research recently 
revealed that people‘s emotional reactions were similar for real-life events and words 
(Rubin & Talarico, 2009). Giving the robustness of the findings, the current studies 
provide the basic results for understanding the effects of emotion on memory, which 
may be applicable to real-life situations to a good extent.  
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